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I. INTRODUCTION 
Incentive-based pay for corporate executives has been at the center of many recent 
controversies. Although “pay for performance” is supposed to help shareholders control 
managers by aligning the financial interests of the two sides, some blame it for the sky-
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rocketing total pay taken home by top executives.1 In the wake of the 2008–2009 
financial crisis, government regulators and legal scholars blame incentive compensation 
for causing, or at least not preventing, the climate of excessive risk taking that led to the 
meltdown.2 As a result, scholars and regulators are working on designing optimal 
incentive compensation schemes that properly set executive incentives to maximize 
profits to the extent possible while also constraining excessive risk seeking.3 
We disagree with these approaches, and in this Article, argue that packing 
compensation with yet more incentives is unlikely to solve the problems of incentive-
based pay. The scholarly proposals have grown more complex as various baskets of 
securities and mixes of salary, bonuses, and pensions combine to form grand 
compensation schemes under which, it is hoped, rational managers will have almost no 
choice but to manage the firm with the optimal degree of risk. The corporate managers of 
the executive compensation literature are like machines whose incentives can be finely 
adjusted in a number of directions with measured changes to the sources of their 
compensation. We argue here that this cannot be so, and that there is a limit to the 
amount of information a corporate executive can process when making a decision on 
behalf of the firm. 
In particular, we are skeptical of recent proposals favoring the use of “inside debt,” 
or corporate debt held by the debtor firm’s insiders,4 as a solution not only to the 
traditional agency problems between creditors and managers, but also to the dangers of 
unrestrained risk in the financial sector. Inside debt in the form of executive pensions or 
deferred cash has become an important part of the mix of mechanisms used to 
compensate corporate managers.5 Recent commentators argue that pensions align 
 
 1.  For a description of the connection between incentive pay and shareholder interests, see Michael C. 
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 353 (1976); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin Murphy, Performance Pay and Top 
Manager Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 242–53 (1990). On the relationship between incentive pay and total 
compensation, see Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the 
Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 847–48 (2002). 
 2.  Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to 
the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 360 (2009); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: 
Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1206 (2011); David I. 
Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 435–36 
(2010). 
 3.  See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 251 
(2010) (proposing that managers of financial firms be paid with a mix of securities that represents the various 
interests making up the firm’s capital structure); Alex Edmans & Qi Liu, Inside Debt, 15 REV. FIN. 75, 77–79 
(2011) (making the case that inside debt compensation is efficient and suggesting that managers of corporations 
be paid with inside debt in a manner that reflects the firm’s capital structure when the company’s debt-to-equity 
ratio is high); Tung, supra note 2 (suggesting that managers of financial firms should be paid with subordinated 
debt securities issued by the bank they manage); Jeffrey Gordon, Executive Compensation and Corporate 
Governance in Financial Firms: The Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay 2 (Columbia Law Sch., Working 
Paper No. 373, July 9, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1633906 (arguing 
that managers of financial firms should be paid with securities that convert from equity to debt if the firm 
reaches a defined level of financial distress). 
 4.  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 352. 
 5.  Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. 823, 835–48 (2005); 
Edmans & Liu, supra note 3, at 76–77. 
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managerial self-interest with the interests of creditors, thereby encouraging conservative 
investment decisions and lowering the cost of debt.6 Similarly, because excessive risk 
taking by financial firms bears much of the responsibility for the recent financial crisis, 
some scholars suggest that the managers of financial firms be compensated with debt 
securities.7 The arguments supporting this compensation scheme derive from the same 
reasoning supporting the use of inside debt in other firms—that it will temper risk 
seeking and align managerial self-interest with the interests of those who bear the 
downside risk of firm failures.8 
We argue, in contrast, that compensation with inside debt is often inefficient, and at 
times not even effective at influencing managerial behavior in the direction stakeholders 
prefer. We argue that inside debt unnecessarily complicates managers’ incentive 
structures and can therefore have perverse incentive effects or none at all. We present 
evidence from the behavioral economics literature that individuals are incapable of 
constantly balancing financial consequences of their decisions, particularly as those 
financial outcomes become more complex and depend on more variables. Highly 
complex pay structures can lead managers to take mental “shortcuts” that reduce the 
quality of all their decisions.9 
Complex compensation schemes also require constant recalibration, making them 
less effective and less reliable methods of incentivizing managers. Legacy costs and 
cross-monitoring costs contribute to this problem. The use of inside debt to pay 
executives imposes legacy costs because inside debt payments are difficult to reverse or 
terminate. Pension and deferred salary obligations can remain even after the firm’s debt 
has been repaid or its financial position or capital structure changes.10 At that point, the 
executive’s incentives would no longer align with any interested party and may be 
inefficiently misaligned with the interests of shareholders. 
Paying with inside debt additionally presents cross-monitoring problems because 
different creditors have different risk preferences, monitoring abilities, and interests. The 
interests of creditors may also differ dramatically from the interests of shareholders when 
the firm is experiencing financial difficulty. The differing interests of those various 
investors and monitors make it difficult to choose what payment scheme to use in order 
to align managerial incentives, and it leads to uncertainty about which interests managers 
should consider paramount. A company may have to rebalance the compensation package 
in order to realign incentives as its financial circumstances or capital structure change. 
That increases the complexity of the compensation scheme and so, as we demonstrate, 
makes it less effective at influencing managerial decision making at all. 
To test our hypothesis that inside debt is not strongly connected to any efficient 
 
 6.  Edmans & Liu, supra note 3, at 77; Rangarajan K. Sundaram & David L. Yermack, Pay Me Later: 
Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial Compensation, 62 J. FIN. 1551, 1554–55 (2007); see Yair Listokin, 
Paying for Performance in Bankruptcy: Why CEOs Should Be Compensated with Debt, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 
783–84 (2007) (making this point about debt-like compensation generally). 
 7.  See generally Tung, supra note 2; Gordon, supra note 3, at 2. 
 8.  Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 3 (suggesting alignment of the interests of managers of financial 
firms with those of common shareholders, preferred shareholders, and bondholders); Gordon, supra note 3, at 1; 
Tung, supra note 2. 
 9.  See infra Part IV (discussing behavioral consequences of complex pay structures). 
 10.  We present evidence of this phenomenon infra text accompanying notes 240–42. 
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contracting goal, we collected original empirical evidence on the determinants of CEO 
pensions and deferred compensation plans. As proponents of inside debt have themselves 
argued, if inside debt were an effective tool for aligning managers with creditor interests, 
we should find a correlation between firm borrowing and the prevalence of inside debt 
payments.11 We find, to the contrary, relatively little evidence for the efficient 
contracting story. We do, however, find considerable evidence that managerial power, 
legacy costs, and the makeup of the board of directors play a significant role in firms’ 
decisions to use inside debt. For example, we find that as the portion of independent 
directors on a board increases, so too does the firm’s use of inside debt, a result we 
explain as likely implying an important role for directors’ personal risk preferences in the 
setting of executive pay. We argue that these findings suggest that actors in the best 
position to judge the efficacy of inside debt so far have not found it a useful tool for 
shaping managerial incentives. 
Overall, we make several notable new contributions to the literature. Pensions, as 
this Article explains, are a key piece of evidence in the debate over whether executive 
pay is strictly optimal, or whether instead it is the result of “managerial power.” Because 
our results cast doubt on the optimal contracting story for pensions, we offer substantial 
support for the managerial power theorists. We also contribute the first skeptical notes on 
proposals for using pay to constrain banker risk taking. And, more generally, we are the 
first to apply the insights of behavioral economics to the question of the efficacy of 
incentive-based pay. 
Part II introduces the basic theory of incentive-based pay and reviews the recent 
literature calling for compensation with inside debt. Part III begins our critique of inside 
debt, arguing that even if all actors are fully rational, inside debt still needlessly creates 
costs that could be avoided simply by using other governance tools. Part IV relaxes the 
rationality assumption, applying the literatures on behavioral household finance and 
bounded rationality in firms to the workings of pay-for-performance mechanisms. Part V 
reviews existing research on the efficacy of inside debt, noting some significant holes in 
studies to date. Part VI presents the results of our original empirical investigation. The 
Article also includes a brief appendix describing our methodology. 
II. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND INSIDE DEBT 
Executive compensation has become one of the primary tools of corporate 
governance.12 It is also one of the most significant tools managers have at their disposal 
to extract value or “rents” from the firm.13 This tension between the two opposing uses of 
executive compensation permeates the academic debate and complicates attempts to 
decide what compensation schemes are most appropriate. Those who find compensation 
 
 11.  Edmans & Liu, supra note 3, at 77. 
 12.  See Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in 
Delaware’s Corporate Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 919 (1982) (discussing stock options as a way to 
incentivize managers to maximize shareholders’ wealth). 
 13.  David I. Walker, The Law and Economics of Executive Compensation: Theory and Evidence, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 232 (Claire Hill & Brett McDonell eds., 
2011); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive 
Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 762 (2002). 
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effective in controlling agency costs argue that it is the product of “optimal contracting,” 
while those who see it as an opportunity for executives to extract rents explain 
compensation arrangements as the result of inappropriate “managerial power.”14 Part 
II.A briefly introduces the basic contours of this debate to readers who may be unfamiliar 
with it. Part II.B explains the possible role of debt in incentive-based pay and summarizes 
recent proposals on that front. 
A. Traditional Incentive Compensation and Agency Costs 
Because widely dispersed shareholders cannot exercise meaningful control over a 
public corporation, they elect directors to oversee the managers who run the day-to-day 
business of the firm.15 Thus, the owners of the business are not the managers, and the 
managers are controlling assets that do not belong to them. This separation of ownership 
from control in the public corporation was brought to light by Berle and Means 80 years 
ago, and the agency costs it creates remain the fundamental problem confronting 
corporate governance.16 
One important way in which managers’ interests diverge from shareholders’ is that 
managers are more risk averse than shareholders.17 While shareholders can diversify 
away firm-specific risk, managers have sunk their reputation and a career’s worth of 
learning in the firm, all of which may be lost if it fails.18 To the extent they are paid with 
salary and pensions, managers are creditors of the firm and can only be paid if the firm 
remains solvent.19 The fixed nature of salary and pension claims means that they have a 
limited upside and will be lost entirely if the firm cannot repay its debts. Shareholders 
have a very different risk profile because they have only the money they paid for their 
shares at stake.20 However, the shareholders’ upside is unlimited. So, when the firm is in 
trouble, shareholders have incentives to take big risks, especially if they are gambling 
with creditors’ money.21 This essential conflict between managerial risk aversion and 
shareholder risk preference imposes agency costs between shareholders and the managers 
 
 14.  Versions of the optimal contracting argument include John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation 
Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1160–61 (2005); Alex Edmans & Xavier 
Gabaix, Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 
486, 493 (2009); Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What’s 
Right and What’s Wrong?, 16 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 12 (2003). The managerial power side includes 
Bebchuk et al., supra note 13, at 753–55; William W. Bratton, The Academic Tournament over Executive 
Compensation, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1561–78 (2005); Lawrence A. Cunningham, A New Legal Theory to 
Test Executive Pay: Contractual Unconscionability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1190–97 (2011). 
 15.  Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 
312–15 (1983). 
 16.  ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER M. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & PRIVATE PROPERTY 17 
(1932); William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 738 
(2000). 
 17.  Walker, supra note 13, at 236–37. 
 18.  Id. at 5 n.11. 
 19.  These elements of executive pay, with various forms of deferred compensation, constitute the “inside 
debt” compensation this Article criticizes. 
 20.  Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 3, at 256. 
 21.  Id. 
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who are supposed to make the business decisions for the shareholders.22 
Equity compensation is designed to overcome the risk-aversion problem by giving 
managers financial incentives to take the risks shareholders would prefer.23 Balancing the 
financial incentives provided by equity pay against the risk aversion created by full-time 
employment and payment with cash is supposed to make managers more risk preferring 
without giving them incentives to be reckless. Of course, if managers hold only the stock 
of their own firm, they will still not be as risk seeking as a diversified shareholder. Many 
firms, therefore, also use additional options to add to managers’ incentives to take risk.24 
Stock and option compensation also help to bridge another major gap between 
investors and managers: effort.25 Given a choice, most of us would rather enjoy leisure 
than work hard. Shareholders cannot easily monitor managerial effort.26 Equity 
compensation, though, rewards managers for the market appraisal of their work and so 
ties their pay to their performance.27 
Whether executive compensation is effective in reducing these agency costs is the 
subject of debate. The “optimal contracting” approach holds that compensation 
mechanisms are designed to reduce the agency costs between executives and 
shareholders.28 It explains executive compensation mechanisms as a product of arms-
length bargaining designed to encourage managers to work toward the goal of 
shareholder wealth maximization.29 On the other hand, the “managerial power” approach 
holds that executives have significant power to influence their own compensation and 
will use that power to extract rents from the corporation, thus deviating from the optimal 
contract shareholders would choose.30 As executives work to hide this rent extraction 
from shareholders, they devise compensation schemes that might actually give them 
incentives at odds with shareholder wealth maximization.31 
Even the optimal contracting framework recognizes that incentive-based pay is not 
always ideal. Incentive-based pay forces the manager to invest her wealth in the firm 
rather than a diversified portfolio. Risk-averse managers must be paid a premium to agree 
to that arrangement, and there is always some risk that the design of the incentive 
contract will be imprecise.32 If agency costs are low, the firm need not incur these extra 
 
 22.  Walker, supra note 13, at 237. 
 23.  Id. at 6. 
 24.  Murphy, supra note 1, at 849. An option is simply the right to buy company stock at a given price. 
Usually this price is set such that the manager only profits if the price rises. If value declines, the option 
becomes worthless but does not otherwise affect the manager. This differential between the “upside” profit 
potential of the option and its limited “downside” risk of loss makes option holders more willing to take risks. 
William Gerard Sanders, Behavioral Responses of CEOs to Stock Ownership and Stock Option Pay, 44 ACAD. 
MGMT. J. 477, 478–79 (2001). 
 25.  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 313. 
 26.  Henry L. Tosi et al., How Much Does Performance Matter? A Meta-Analysis of CEO Pay Studies, 26 
J. MGMT. 301, 304–05 (2000). 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Core et al., supra note 14. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Bebchuk et al., supra note 13, at 753–54. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  George P. Baker, Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement, 100 J. POL. ECON. 598, 599–
600, 606 (1992); Tosi et al., supra note 26. 
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costs, and so incentive-based pay is not optimal.33 Additionally, sometimes the potential 
size of equity compensation makes managers risk preferring to a degree that might have 
collateral consequences for the market or society in general.34 When a firm is in financial 
distress, the hope of realizing significant returns from equity compensation may 
encourage managers to take bigger risks, hoping that big returns will repay the creditors 
and make the firm solvent, and the managers wealthy, again. Conflicts such as these have 
been blamed for the excessive risk taking that led to the recent financial crisis.35 
B. Proposals to Pay with Inside Debt 
Shareholders are not the only investors in a firm. In addition to selling stock, firms 
also raise money by borrowing.36 As we have just explained, when a firm is solvent, the 
conventional wisdom supports paying managers with equity to align their interests and 
risk profiles with shareholders.37 When a firm is highly leveraged or experiencing 
financial trouble, the same reasoning might support paying managers with debt of the 
firm to align their interests with those of dominant creditors.38 Commentators call this 
form of compensation “inside debt” because it is held by firm insiders.39 We first 
consider inside debt in the typical firm and then financial firms in particular. 
1. Inside Debt Compensation in Non-Financial Firms 
Proponents argue that inside debt is efficient because it aligns creditor and 
managerial interests.40 When bankruptcy threatens, managers might be tempted to take 
big gambles. If they lose, the firm fails, as it would have anyway; but if they win, they 
preserve their investments in the firm.41 Other managers might simply abandon the firm 
entirely. Both actions would seriously threaten the interests of creditors, who typically 
prefer to avoid risks. Since they are collectively guaranteed repayment in full as long as 
firm assets are adequate to cover debt, creditors want to avoid any bets that might result 
in losses in excess of that threshold.42 Tying managers’ pay to debt, under this theory, is 
supposed to make them particularly sensitive to liquidation value; they must steer the 
 
 33.  Tosi et al., supra note 26. 
 34.  Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 3, at 250. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, Financial Intermediation, in 1 A HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF 
FINANCE 431, 433 (George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003). 
 37.  Walker, supra note 13, at 236–37. 
 38.  Barry Adler’s “Chameleon Equity” work supported this intuition by suggesting the replacement of 
shareholders with the reigning residual claimant and using that rotating equity system to obviate the need for 
bankruptcy. Barry Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 311, 323 (1993). Similar reasoning underlies the Jensen and Meckling supposition that it might make 
sense to provide compensation packages to managers that combine the use of debt and equity. Jensen & 
Meckling, supra note 1, at 352. 
 39.  Edmans & Liu, supra note 3, at 75 n.1. 
 40.  See Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 6, at 1559–64 (discussing the ability of pensions to align 
managerial interests with those of creditors). 
 41.  Tung, supra note 2. 
 42.  Charles K. Whitehead, Creditors and Debt Governance, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 68, 73 (Claire Hill & Brett McDonell eds., 2011). 
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firm carefully enough to preserve money to pay off those debts.43 
While we are unaware of any significant real-world examples of executives being 
paid with debt instruments of their firms, both pensions and deferred compensation can 
be quite similar to paying with bonds. Because of U.S. tax law, firms have strong 
incentives to ensure that promises of future payments to their CEOs be paid from general 
corporate funds rather than, say, a segregated account that might be protected from the 
corporation’s creditors.44 As a result, in the event of a bankruptcy, a CEO still waiting for 
promised cash must stand in line with other creditors. So, pensions and deferred 
compensation, like other forms of debt compensation, arguably align managers’ 
incentives with that of creditors by putting both in a similar economic position. 
Pensions and deferred compensation are widespread. Two studies completed by 
Sundaram and Yermack, and Bebchuk and Jackson find that payment with pensions is 
widespread among various companies with varying degrees of financial health in 
different industries.45 
Bebchuk and Jackson argue that pensions are evidence not of optimal contracting, 
but rather of managerial power.46 Because, until recently, companies did not have to 
disclose the value of pension benefits, it was difficult for investors to discern how much 
of an executive’s compensation was due after his tenure with the firm ended and to what 
extent he was being paid with inside debt.47 Bebchuk and Jackson argue that their finding 
of substantial pension awards in a large number and variety of firms provides evidence 
that investors would be grossly misled about the value of executive compensation if they 
were not informed about the value of pensions.48 The fact that these large payments of 
inside debt to managers were disguised from the market, they claim, supports scholars’ 
claims that inside debt compensation in the form of pensions is a product of managerial 
power rather than optimal contracting.49 Indeed, if pensions were an effective way to 
align managers’ interests with shareholders, firms would have voluntarily disclosed their 
use in order to enjoy the higher stock prices such good news for equity would have 
 
 43.  Edmans & Liu, supra note 3, at 77; see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 334–35 (explaining why 
managers would take riskier bets than creditors prefer). 
 44.  Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the “Time Value of Money”, 95 YALE L.J. 506, 520–
23 (1986); see I.R.C. § 409A (2011) (setting out rules for taxation of deferred compensation). If this condition is 
met, a CEO can defer paying tax on promised future payouts until the time they are received. Deferral is very 
valuable because it means that the CEO can earn interest on the amount she would have paid in tax for the 
entire time her tax bill is deferred. If future payments are protected from other creditors, then the CEO must pay 
tax on the present value of the payment at the time the promise is made, sacrificing the value of deferral.  
To be clear, we should distinguish the form of “nonqualified” pension discussed here from the standard 
pensions most readers have experienced first-hand, pensions that are “qualified” for particularly favorable tax 
treatment. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Stealth Compensation via Retirement Benefits, 1 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 291, 302–03 (2004). 
 45.  Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. 823, 838 (2005); 
Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 6, at 1570. 
 46.  Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 45, at 829–31; see also LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY 
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 98–99 (2004). 
 47.  Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 45, at 824–26. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id.; Bebchuk et al., supra note 13, at 789 (“A large extraction of rents will not cause the executives or 
directors harm if it can be dressed, packaged, or hidden—in short, camouflaged—so that it is not readily 
apparent as such.”). 
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attracted.50 
Finance scholars have disputed the claim that inside debt compensation is a form of 
managerial rent extraction, arguing that, in some limited circumstances, inside debt 
compensation can properly be seen as an example of optimal contracting.51 Edmans and 
Liu conclude that the use of inside debt to compensate managers makes sense when a 
firm is in or approaching bankruptcy, or when its liquidation value is important and 
sensitive to managers’ decision making.52 They claim inside debt compensation is useful 
in these situations because, unlike alternatives such as promises of bonuses or increased 
salary, it gives managers incentives to increase the firm’s liquidation value and provides 
incentives for greater effort when the firm nears insolvency.53 They emphasize that 
effective inside debt should have the same priority in bankruptcy as the firm’s relevant 
creditors.54 In firms with different kinds of debt, managers would have to be 
compensated with a mix of inside debt that approximates the firm’s capital structure in 
order for the debt compensation to be “effective,” that is, to encourage the effort 
necessary to enhance the firm’s liquidation value.55 
Similarly, Yair Listokin (writing before Edmans and Liu) suggests paying CEOs of 
corporate debtors in possession (DIPs)56 with unsecured debt.57 Listokin proposes 
granting CEOs a “vertical strip” of debt, meaning that the CEO would hold percentages 
of each level of unsecured debt.58 Using a vertical strip of debt instead of granting the 
CEO a portion of the junior-most claims would ensure that the idiosyncratic interests of 
one creditor are not preferred at the expense of the class.59 Listokin’s goal is to 
encourage managers to enhance the value of the bankrupt firm by giving them a share of 
the residual recovery.60 It is a way for the CEO to realize upside potential again after her 
equity stake is rendered worthless. 
Scholars who responded directly to Listokin’s article argued, though, that the agency 
costs in a bankruptcy case are too low to justify the cost of incentive pay.61 The 
bankruptcy court, the U.S. Trustee’s Office of the Department of Justice, the creditors’ 
 
 50.  Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 45, at 824–26. 
 51.  Edmans & Liu, supra note 3. 
 52.  Id. at 92 (“[T]he manager’s debt-to-equity ratio is increasing in his effect on the liquidation value and 
the probability of bankruptcy, and decreasing in growth opportunities.”). 
 53.  Id. at 77–78. 
 54.  Id. at 76.  
 55.  Id. at 78. 
 56.  A debtor in possession is a bankruptcy debtor under a reorganization chapter of the Bankruptcy Code 
who remains in possession and control of its assets. A corporate debtor is considered “in possession” if it is 
operated by duly appointed officers and directors and not under the direction of a bankruptcy trustee. 7-110 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1100.01 (16th ed. 2010). 
 57.  Listokin, supra note 6, at 783. 
 58.  Id. at 783, 785. 
 59.  Id. at 785. 
 60.  Id. at 783. 
 61.  Adam J. Levitin, The Problematic Case for Incentive Compensation in Bankruptcy, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. PENNUMBRA 88, 94 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/response.php?rid=18; Jonathan C. 
Lipson, Where’s the Beef? A Few Words About Paying for Performance in Bankruptcy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 64, 65 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/response.php?rid=20; Robert K. 
Rasmussen, On the Scope of Managerial Discretion in Chapter 11, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 77, 78 
(2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/response.php?rid=19. 
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committee, DIP lenders, and secured creditors all closely supervise the executives 
managing chapter 11 debtors in possession.62 Any of the parties with power over the 
debtor in possession can move for the appointment of a trustee if they think the debtor’s 
management is incompetent or disloyal, that is, if they think the appointment of a trustee 
would be in the best interests of the estate’s parties in interest.63 That threat will have 
much more of an impact on executive decision making than the amount of compensation 
an executive might realize from debt holdings after the conclusion of the 
reorganization.64 Stakeholders designed incentive compensation to constrain the agency 
costs of executive decision making in situations where shareholders, the putative 
principals, could exercise very little direct oversight.65 Bankruptcy does not present the 
same problems, so these scholars argue that incentive compensation may not be the right 
solution.66 
Moving beyond the insolvency scenario, the finance scholarship hypothesizes that 
paying managers with inside debt lowers the cost of credit for the firm because it lowers 
the agency costs of debt.67 That would potentially make payment with inside debt useful 
in healthy firms as well. If creditors can expect managers to be more sympathetic to 
creditors’ interests, then creditors will be more willing to loan money to the firm and will 
charge lower interest rates. It is theoretically possible that those savings in interest would 
compensate the firm, and so shareholders, for any change in managerial incentives.68 If 
that were the case, there should not be a decline in equity correlated to the revelation of 
inside debt compensation. One study found that firms with significant, disclosed inside 
debt holdings by managers enjoyed increased bond prices, but also realized decreased 
equity prices upon revelation of the payment scheme.69 Other findings suggest that 
managers receiving inside debt in the form of pensions manage the firm more 
conservatively as measured by distance-to-default.70 
These findings therefore set up an important conflict between the managerial power 
and efficient contracting theories we have mentioned. While Bebchuk and his various co-
authors, among others, see pensions as evidence that managers hide rents from 
shareholders, inside debt proponents suggest instead that pensions may actually serve 
shareholder interests, and hence do not constitute evidence in favor of the managerial 
power hypothesis. We argue in the ensuing Parts that the efficient contracting story is less 
persuasive than supporters claim—and, by implication, that pensions may be hallmarks 
of managerial power. 
 
 62.  See Lipson, supra note 61, at 70 (noting that corporate debtors are in a “fishbowl”). 
 63.  11 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)–(b) (2011). 
 64.  See Rasmussen, supra note 61, at 84 (arguing that the “threat of replacement” of a manager of a 
troubled or bankrupt company “casts a long shadow”). 
 65.  Id. at 78–79. 
 66.  Levitin, supra note 61, at 94–96; Lipson, supra note 61, at 70; Rasmussen, supra note 61, at 77–78 
(pointing to the significant degree of creditor control before and during bankruptcy). 
 67.  Edmans & Liu, supra note 3, at 90; Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 6, at 1583. 
 68.  See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 312–13, 338 (explaining that owners of firms bear total 
agency costs of the firms’ contracts). 
 69.  Edmans & Liu, supra note 3, at 90. 
 70.  Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 6, at 1555. 
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2. Inside Debt Compensation in Financial Firms 
Shareholders and creditors are not always the only parties affected by managerial 
risk preferences. Excessive risk taking in financial firms bears much of the responsibility 
for the financial crisis in 2008–2009 and the consensus seems to be that that risk taking 
was exacerbated, if not encouraged, by equity compensation designed to align managers’ 
interests with those of shareholders.71 Bebchuk and Spamann argue that particular 
attributes of financial firms’ capital structures and executive compensation make those 
managers more likely to take excessive risks than managers of non-financial firms.72 As 
we will explain, financial firms are very similar to financially distressed or highly 
leveraged non-financial firms in terms of capital structure and managerial incentives, so it 
is not surprising to see scholars using similar reasoning to explain the usefulness of inside 
debt compensation for “systemically important” financial firms. 
Banks tend to be more highly leveraged than non-financial firms, in part because a 
significant part of their business is deposits, which they treat as loans made to the bank.73 
This enhanced leverage makes banks more like troubled companies in their risk profiles, 
so creditor and shareholder interests and risk preferences diverge more dramatically than 
in healthy non-financial firms.74 Shareholders are willing to take big gambles with 
creditors’ money in the hopes of realizing big returns.75 
Unlike financially distressed non-financial firms, however, banks are not as 
carefully monitored or controlled by their creditors. Bank creditors do not have the same 
strong incentives to monitor or to insist upon or enforce the same kinds of restrictive loan 
covenants that creditors of non-financial firms demand.76 For instance, depositors are 
protected by FDIC insurance, so they need not worry about monitoring bank 
executives.77 The bailouts of the financial firms in 2009 enhanced the moral hazard 
problem and extended it to other bank creditors such as bondholders.78 Government 
regulation could, theoretically, fill that gap, but government regulation of banks has 
declined in recent decades so that regulation may not be as effective as typical creditor 
monitoring.79 Therefore, with banks, we see the usual agency problems that confront 
non-financial firms when they near insolvency, but the banks’ capital structures and 
corporate governance schemes do not provide the same protections provided by non-
 
 71.  Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 3, at 249–52; John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the 
SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 729–30 (2009); Jeff N. Gordon, “Say on 
Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-in, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
323, 363–64 (2009). 
 72.  Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 3, at 258–61 (detailing the capital structures of bank and bank 
holding companies and how that affects managerial incentives). 
 73.  Id. at 251–52. 
 74. John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd–Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory 
Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 803–04 (2011) (explaining that financial firms lack the 
equity cushion that would enable them to absorb some losses); Tung, supra note 2, at 1206, 1210. 
 75.  Tung, supra note 2, at 1211−12; Coffee & Sale, supra note 71, at 799. This point is made clearly by 
Chancellor Allen in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 
WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
 76.  Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 3, at 266. 
 77.  Id. at 256–57. 
 78.  Id. at 266. 
 79.  Tung, supra note 2, at 1215–16. 
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financial firms. Bebchuk and Spamann argue that the moral hazard problem and resulting 
lack of creditor control allow shareholders to be the dominant influence on managers.80 
Thus, they in effect claim that agency costs in financial firms remain high, unlike in 
bankruptcy. 
Because shareholders of a financial firm, like shareholders of a highly leveraged 
non-financial firm, do not have much at stake, they have incentives to take significant 
risks. Shareholders have very little downside exposure in such a highly leveraged firm 
because they are able to borrow the money the bank will invest. Further, to the extent 
those shareholders are heavily invested in the financial firm and not diversified across the 
economy, they are shielded from the systemic risks financial firm behavior can cause.81 
If financial firm managers are compensated with equity, they are similarly protected from 
the consequences of risk taking.  Managers thus shielded from risk can impose significant 
societal costs. Societal cost is an important issue when considering the incentives of bank 
executives because taxpayers bear the cost of failing banks, either through the payment of 
FDIC insurance or, more drastically, through government bailouts.82 Taxpayers, like 
shareholders, are rationally ignorant of bank financing and do not monitor the bank or its 
regulator closely, again leaving agency costs high.83 
Because the problem with the governance of banks seems to be excessive risk taking 
and executive compensation, and the incentives of bank executives seem to be largely 
responsible for that problem, legal scholars have sensibly turned to those areas to suggest 
reforms. Particularly, those scholars have suggested that banks structure the 
compensation of their executives to align the executives’ interests more closely with 
creditors in order to balance against the strong incentives executives have to take 
excessive risk.84 In this regard, the scholars advocating inside debt compensation in 
financial firms appear to avoid the criticisms leveled against Listokin’s proposal—agency 
costs in financial firms are indeed high. These scholars claim that compensating bank 
executives with debt securities would make them more risk averse by removing the 
possibility of large upside gains.85 
While the scholars considering executive compensation in financial firms agree 
about how to frame the problem, they have proposed different solutions. Bebchuk and 
Spamann suggest tying compensation to a basket of securities much broader than a bank 
or holding company’s common stock.86 They argue that compensation should reflect the 
value of preferred shares and bonds rather than just common stock.87 Further, if 
executives receive bonuses based on particular accounting metrics, Bebchuk and 
Spamann argue that the banks should choose metrics that reflect the interests of preferred 
shareholders and bondholders.88 Fred Tung suggests that banks pay their executives of 
 
 80.  Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 3, at 255–56. 
 81.  Gordon, supra note 3, at 6. 
 82.  Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 3, at 255–57 (explaining the moral hazard problem in banks). 
 83.  See Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, Parties as Political Intermediaries, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1453, 1453 
(2002) (describing rational ignorance theory). 
 84.  Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 3, at 269; Gordon, supra note 3, at 1; Tung, supra note 2, at 1216. 
 85.  Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 3, at 260; Tung, supra note 2, at 1207–08. 
 86.  Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 3, at 253. 
 87.  Id. at 284. 
 88.  Id.  
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financial firms with “their bank’s publicly traded subordinated debt securities.”89 In a 
liquidation, this debt would be paid after depositors and other creditors are paid in full but 
before shareholders are paid. 
In a way, Jeffrey Gordon’s proposal picks up where Tung’s leaves off. Gordon also 
advocates paying the executives of financial firms with subordinated debt, but rather than 
paying managers with a mix of securities that includes inside debt throughout the life of 
the firm, he suggests paying managers with convertible equity securities.90 These equity 
securities would convert to subordinated debt upon the occurrence of particular 
indications of financial distress.91 
Of course, there are important differences in detail between these proposals, but for 
our purposes, they share two common assumptions. First, all three presume that paying 
managers with debt would in fact shift managerial preferences for risk in the desired 
direction. Second, each implicitly assumes that the societal gains of those altered risk 
preferences will exceed any efficiency costs of inside debt. We argue in the ensuing Parts 
that neither of these assumptions is beyond doubt. 
III. WHY COMPENSATION WITH INSIDE DEBT IS INEFFICIENT 
Even accepting the premises of the scholars advocating the use of inside debt 
compensation, we think their arguments fall short for several reasons. First, inside debt 
compensation appears unnecessary in light of other options for protecting creditor 
interests. Second, unless perfectly calibrated, inside debt compensation will misalign 
managerial incentives and, even if it is perfectly calibrated, it may provide perverse 
incentives by giving managers downside protection they would not already have. Third, 
inside debt compensation imposes legacy costs as the corporation’s capital structure 
changes. To the extent inside debt compensation is inflexible, debt incentives may remain 
for managers after the corporation’s use of debt has declined or been eliminated. Further, 
adjusting the effects of inside debt compensation after the fact not only increases the 
complexity of the compensation scheme, but may significantly increase overall 
compensation and make it more difficult to calculate on an annual basis. 
A. Inferior to Alternatives 
Our first objection to inside debt is that, in most settings, it seems inferior to 
alternative tools for aligning managers’ interests with creditors. One of the most basic of 
these alternative tools is managers’ own risk aversion. As we have explained, a central 
concern of both ordinary creditors and guarantors of financial firms is that managers will 
take excess risk. However, there are already many factors that tend to keep management 
relatively risk averse: salary, reputation, undiversified human capital, and shareholder 
pressure for long term growth.92 Managers become risk seeking mostly because firms use 
equity and option compensation to reduce the agency costs for shareholders with short-
 
 89.  Tung, supra note 2, at 1207. 
 90.  Gordon, supra note 3, at 8. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options, 90 AM. 
ECON. REV. 209, 211 (2000) (discussing exercise-price policy for stock option compensation). 
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term profit goals.93 In effect, inside debt is necessary principally to moderate risk 
preferences where the firm has already chosen to pay managers to be risk seeking. 
If this diagnosis is accurate, it suggests that inside debt is a relatively wasteful route 
to risk aversion. Firms could obtain the same outcomes by moderating their equity-based 
compensation.94 Both alternatives require a tradeoff between creditor and shareholder 
agency costs, but one involves reducing expenditures on pay while the other increases it. 
As a solution to the systemic risk problem, adding inside debt is likely to be politically 
popular with managers because it enriches them, but it is not clear that is a reason to 
favor it.95 
For non-financial firms, the agency costs of debt are low, even outside of 
bankruptcy, because of contractual protections creditors reserve in loan agreements. 
Covenants are one example. Some common covenants allow creditors to bar firms from 
transferring their assets, distributing them to shareholders, or taking on large debt with a 
superior priority to the existing loan—all events that would reduce the value of the credit 
instrument.96 Institutional creditors, such as groups of banks, have strong covenants that 
give them significant control over corporate spending and decision making once the 
corporation reaches a particular level of financial distress.97 Another example is secured 
credit. Secured creditors can protect themselves by foreclosing or threatening to foreclose 
on their collateral.98 They may even be able to control the corporation’s use of its income 
to the extent they have security interests in accounts receivable or other cash collateral.99 
Dispersed bondholders may also have a designated representative enforcing particular 
covenants and performing important monitoring on their behalf.100 
The low agency costs of credit imply that inside debt is likely not optimal. As 
explained earlier, incentive-based compensation is needlessly costly when direct 
monitoring is feasible.101 So, just as in bankruptcy itself, inside debt would be merely 
cumulative to existing contractual protections creditors wield. And the firm’s likely need 
for future credit gives lenders power to extract change even absent covenants.102 
Edmans and Liu suggest, however, that covenants may be an imperfect way of 
lowering agency costs because managers may make decisions for the sole purpose of 
 
 93.  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 352; Murphy, supra note 1, at 857–60. 
 94.  Indeed, this point is already well-understood in the finance literature. See generally Teresa John & 
Kose John, Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure, 48 J. FIN. 949 (1993) (discussing equity-
based compensation).  
 95.  For more extensive discussion of this tradeoff, see Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: 
Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 847–49 (2012). 
 96.  Chenyang Wei, Covenant Protection, Credit Spread Dynamics and Managerial Incentives 2 (Nov. 29, 
2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~cwei/JobMarket_CovenantsSpread 
CEOIncentive_ChenyangWei.pdf. 
 97.  Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of 
Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1226–28 (2006). 
 98.  Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other Peoples’ Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309, 1333 
(2008). 
 99.  Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 926–27 (1986). 
 100.  WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 255 (9th ed. 2004). 
 101.  See supra notes 32–34.  
 102.  Whitehead, supra note 42, at 69. 
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avoiding a covenant violation and covenants may be irrevocably violated.103 It is true 
that covenants themselves lack the flexibility that mechanisms like fiduciary duties or 
incentive compensation can provide, but much of their strength is in the ability creditors 
have to waive the enforcement of covenants if other concessions are made.104 For 
instance, a creditor can choose not to declare a default if the corporation agrees to hire a 
reorganization officer. This bargaining in the shadow of the covenant offers more 
flexibility and more room for managerial input than Edmans and Liu appear to assume. 
An additional way in which covenants are preferable to inside debt is their 
predictability.105 Through covenants, creditors may dictate what powers they will have 
over corporate decision making, at what times, what corporate decisions they may veto, 
and what assets they have special rights to.106 Covenants allow creditors to protect the 
negotiated-for relative priority of their claims, so that by comparing available assets to 
claims they can predict the consequences of insolvency and default.107 Incentive pay is 
relatively more opaque because it depends on personal characteristics of the manager, 
many of which are states of the manager’s mind or external factors that change over time. 
Admittedly, the market’s widespread use of covenants does raise questions about 
whether managerial risk aversion alone is an adequate protection for creditors and 
guarantors of financial firms, where covenants may be infeasible.108 There is evidence, 
though, that covenants are substitutes for curtailing option pay—that is, that either route 
is effective at protecting creditors.109 Covenants may be more popular than reducing 
incentive compensation where feasible because they allow shareholders to free ride on 
creditors who monitor credit terms.110 Or the combination of covenants and option pay 
may result from the influence of managers who would otherwise face lower total 
compensation.  
Another disadvantage of inside debt relative to other options is that it imposes cross-
monitoring costs if the inside debt is not perfectly calibrated. If, for instance, inside debt 
compensation aligns managerial interests with the most junior tranche of public debt, 
creditors who are senior to that level of debt will have to take the new managerial 
incentives into account in their agreements with the firm. If inside debt compensation is 
designed to incentivize managers to increase the firm’s liquidation value, so as to engage 
in risks designed to enhance the value of the firm after insolvency, it might influence 
managers’ decision making by encouraging decisions that are riskier than senior creditors 
would prefer. Rational senior creditors would adjust their rights and covenants in order to 
 
 103.  Edmans & Liu, supra note 3, at 83. 
 104.  Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 97. 
 105.  On the costs of uncertainty in monitoring contracts, see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 325 n.27. 
 106.  Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 97; Kelli A. Alces, Strategic Governance, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1053, 
1074–75 (2008) (discussing particular loan covenants in a credit agreement between a consortium of banks and 
Visteon Corp.). 
 107.  Baird & Henderson, supra note 98, at 1332–33. 
 108.  Covenants are probably rare in the financial firm setting because the effective creditors are largely 
taxpayers and small depositors, who cannot easily negotiate, monitor, and enforce complex contracts with 
banks. 
 109.  See Wei, supra note 96, at 3–4 (finding that increased covenant protection mitigates the credit cost of 
option compensation). 
 110.  Whitehead, supra note 42, at 75. 
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counteract those incentives. Such adjustments are difficult because the effects of 
compensation incentives are less predictable than the direct mandates of covenants. This 
problem of cross-monitoring, where different creditor interests will have to work harder 
to monitor management as managerial incentives change and will have to adjust their 
powers and positions within the capital structure accordingly, introduces costs that may 
overwhelm whatever gains could be realized by lowering managers’ risk profiles. 
Listokin’s suggestion that managers of bankrupt firms should be paid with a 
“vertical strip” of unsecured debt111 could be expanded in a way that would allow inside 
debt compensation to overcome the cross-monitoring objection. If managers were paid 
with a “vertical strip” of the firm’s debt, even outside of bankruptcy, managers would 
have a pay package that aligned their incentives proportionately with every level of debt. 
Indeed, managers could receive a package of incentive compensation that perfectly 
approximates the corporation’s entire capital structure, thereby having incentives 
perfectly aligned with the corporation as a whole. A firm could realize the same effect by 
paying managers according to a bonus structure that approximates the firm’s capital 
structure. 
We argue that these alternatives would not be optimal forms of compensation. As 
argued in Part IV, managers are unlikely to figure out how each decision will affect their 
personal compensation package when there are so many variables in play.112 Further, 
expanding incentive-based pay to cover yet more stakeholders is likely to further increase 
the premium paid to the manager for increasing firm-specific risk. And, in any event, 
Listokin’s solution does not help defenders of inside debt justify its current practice. In 
reality, the only inside debt firms use are pensions and deferred compensation, both of 
which are unsecured and highly long-term obligations, leaving secured and short-term 
creditors unprotected. 
B. Misaligns Incentives 
Even if inside debt were not costlier than its alternatives, it would be less desirable 
because of its potential to shield managers excessively from the costs of their decisions. 
Of course, if inside debt compensation is too senior such that it is “received in all states 
of nature,” then it will not encourage managers to protect creditors because the managers’ 
pay is not meaningfully at risk.113 Any fixed payment that an executive will receive in 
bankruptcy ahead of other creditors, such as salary, will be too senior to be effective 
payment of inside debt.114 The main point here is more subtle, though. In many 
instances, inside debt may be guaranteed or manipulated, leaving managers in an 
effectively senior position, and therefore also leaving them with sub-optimal incentives to 
protect other stakeholder interests. 
For example, the seniority problem implies that inside debt is unlikely to solve the 
problem of excessive risk in financial firms. If managers stand in the shoes of creditors, 
 
 111.  Listokin, supra note 6, at 783. 
 112.  See infra Part IV (examining the behavioral theory of complex pay packages and its possible effect 
decisions of executives). 
 113.  Edmans & Liu, supra note 3, at 83. 
 114.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 209 (2008) (explaining moral hazard of 
bank regulation). 
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government guarantees create moral hazard for managers the same as for any other lender 
who expects a bailout.115 That is, if the government insures managers (together with 
other creditors) against downside risk but leaves them with some potential upside, 
managers will strongly prefer risk.116 On the other hand, if there is limited or no 
protection for those holding bank bonds, then inside debt compensation may indeed 
encourage risk aversion. If that were true, though bondholders, no longer guaranteed a 
payment, would have reason to monitor management. The argument that financial firms 
are fundamentally different from non-financial firms then falters. 
A compromise between these two extremes could be to adopt a rule that managers’ 
claims would not be insured or bailed out by the government. But this fails too, because 
then those claims would be too junior to align managers’ interests perfectly with any 
class of creditors. If the inside debt used to pay managers is too junior, it will too closely 
resemble stock and will not have significantly different incentive effects than equity 
compensation. True, the upside of junior debt is limited in a way the upside potential of 
equity is not. But, if a firm is insolvent and not able to pay its junior-most creditors in 
full, giving managers claims below that level will give them incentives to take risks in 
order to receive something rather than nothing. Edmans and Liu point out that if a 
particular kind of compensation will not survive insolvency at all, such as solvency-
dependent bonuses, that form of payment will not have the good incentive effects inside 
debt is supposed to have.117 In order to have the effects its proponents recommend, inside 
debt compensation cannot be either too senior or too junior; rather, it must be “just right.” 
It may be that the problem with financial firm governance is not risk taking per se, 
but instead that creditors do not have sufficient incentives to monitor because the 
government guarantees their claims. If so, then giving managers creditor claims would 
not solve the problem. Inside debt substitutes for direct creditor control,118 so use of 
inside debt reduces monitoring. 
In similar fashion, if managers can control the seniority of their compensation then 
inside debt can actually lead to more risk taking than creditors would prefer. We argue 
that inside debt allows managers to hedge against their equity compensation and holdings 
by affording them downside protection. Without debt compensation, if a manager caused 
the firm to take an improvident risk, she might lose all of the equity value she held in the 
firm. With debt compensation, that manager is still paid at least the amount of her inside 
debt, allowing her to take more risks than she otherwise would.119 
 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Gordon’s proposal arguably mitigates this problem by converting manager equity to debt, reducing 
the possibility for upside gains. See Gordon, supra note 3 (proposing a new compensation mechanism in which 
managers’ equity is connected to debt in order to help reduce risk). But managers can still collect bonuses for 
successful wagers. Perhaps a theoretically more appealing approach would be for the government explicitly to 
deny bailout protection for managers or creditors. However, that would put managers in a different risk position 
than other creditors, introducing new agency costs. It is unclear if it would be politically feasible in any event. 
 117.  Edmans & Liu, supra note 3, at 77. 
 118.  Cong Wang et al., Managerial Ownership of Debt and Bank Loan Contracting 4 (Nov. 29, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1703473. Admittedly, though, if monitoring is 
already very low, and inside debt improves managerial behavior in some other way, inside debt might be better 
than nothing.   
 119.  See David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive 
Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440, 453 (2000) (explaining that hedged compensation no longer serves a 
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Of course, the value of this hedge is much diminished if managers must stand in line 
with other creditors to state their claims, but it turns out that is not always the case.  
While Sundaram and Yermack point out that executive pensions are “unsecured, 
unfunded debt claims” that would “stand in line with other unsecured creditors,”120 work 
by other scholars suggests that those pensions may actually trump the claims of other 
creditors in bankruptcy. Bebchuk and Jackson report that firms often allow executives to 
take a one-time cash payout of the actuarial value of their pensions, and that companies 
often assume executive pension obligations in full in bankruptcy even when other 
creditor claims are left unpaid.121 Because the manager is effectively senior to creditors, 
she is not actually aligned with their interests. 
In essence, the downside protection story may be another instance of managerial 
power. The promise of a more balanced level of risk taking might lull shareholders and 
board members into a false sense that inside debt adequately constrains agency costs. In 
practice, inside debt appears at least as likely to protect managers from the full costs of 
their mistakes, risk taking, or poor judgment. 
The secret seniority of inside debt may also allow managers to extract higher pay 
than they otherwise could. Managers cannot typically publicly hedge against their inside 
equity positions because of the negative signal that would send to the market, among 
other reasons.122 Compensation theorists argue that managers are paid a premium to 
offset this inability to diversify their firm-specific risk.123 By concealing the extent of the 
true seniority of their pensions, managers can get the best of both worlds: they get paid a 
premium for taking on firm-specific risk, while in fact hedging away much of that risk. 
To be sure, perfectly rational boards negotiating with managers would likely anticipate 
hedging behavior. But rationally ignorant shareholders or other observers likely would 
not—thus, allowing boards captured by their CEO to use firm-specific risk as a rhetorical 
prop for higher pay. 
Lastly, scholars supporting the use of subordinated debt securities to compensate the 
managers of financial firms claim to have discovered the “just right” balance between 
seniority and juniority of debt incentives. These scholars propose to give executives 
publicly traded debt securities at the right level of subordination to mitigate the strong 
risk preference caused by bank holding–company equity compensation.124 Sensitivity to 
the market price of the inside debt security should act to influence managerial decision 
making even before the bond matures.125 Gordon argues that cutting off the upside 
provided by equity compensation and replacing it with debt securities will give managers 
the right incentives to maximize corporate value in bankruptcy or through a period of 
insolvency without bankruptcy.126 
 
risk-altering function). 
 120.  Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 6, at 1560. 
 121.  Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 45, at 831; see also Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 44, at 309 
(describing firms that have used outside insurers to guarantee executive pensions in the event of looming 
insolvency). 
 122.  Murphy, supra note 1, at 865; Schizer, supra note 119, at 474–94. 
 123.  Murphy, supra note 1, at 865. 
 124.  Gordon, supra note 3, at 11; Tung, supra note 2, at 1207−08. 
 125.  Tung, supra note 2, at 1227–29. 
 126.  Gordon, supra note 3, at 11. 
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Even if a compensation scheme cuts off the upside potential of equity compensation, 
as Gordon’s does, giving managers shares of publicly traded debt or well-assured pension 
entitlements provides downside protection, a benefit shareholders do not enjoy. Because 
inside debt, whatever its level of seniority, increases the odds of a soft landing for 
executives, it will still likely misalign their incentives. An attempt to balance managers’ 
risk preferences and incentives actually gives managers the best of both worlds and 
allows them to hedge against the risks of each position. 
C. Inefficient Way to Adjust Incentives as Firm Changes 
A final set of problems facing even fully rational actors relates to what we call the 
legacy costs of inside debt. Those who advocate the use of inside debt as a form of 
efficient contracting concede that it is only useful in certain circumstances.127 A 
corporation’s capital structure changes over time, moving through periods of relative 
financial health and distress. A firm might be highly leveraged at one point and then pay 
the debt off and have relatively few debt obligations at another point. 
However, the forms of inside debt used and proposed, particularly pensions and debt 
securities, are not short-term, or even necessarily temporary forms of compensation. 
Pension obligations can last for the rest of an executive’s life. If a firm grants a manager 
bonds with a maturity date of four years, that form of compensation continues for four 
years even if the firm’s circumstances might change in the meantime. Even in perpetually 
highly leveraged firms or financial firms circumstances may change, the kinds of debt 
issued may differ, and debt covenants themselves may change as different investors enter 
the firm.128 
It appears that firms commonly deal with this problem by “re-balancing.” In order to 
correct for the residual incentive effects of inside debt, firms add countervailing equity 
compensation.129 For example, Jack Welch, the CEO of General Electric, received 
hundreds of millions in equity compensation as he neared retirement, apparently in order 
to offset the effects of massive gains in the expected value of his pension.130 This is a 
puzzle. By simple math, it is cheaper to increase risk seeking by buying out the 
manager’s existing inside debt than by adding equity.131 Perhaps this is another instance 
of managerial power. Or there may be other explanations, such as endowment effects or 
the framing of losses making buy-outs prohibitively expensive, tax timing effects, or 
 
 127.  See supra Part II.B. 
 128.  See John E. Core et al., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, 9 ECON. POL’Y 
REV. 27, 34–35, 39 (2003) (observing that transaction costs may create slack between optimal and actual 
contracts and explaining the effect of changing CEO wealth on optimal incentive contracts). 
 129.  Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 6, at 1553. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  This is because buying out debt reduces the total outstanding value of securities in the denominator of 
the executive’s personal debt to equity ratio. In contrast, adding more stock increases the denominator, further 
increasing the amount of stock that must be given. For instance, suppose the CEO has a debt-equity ratio of $40 
million debt to $60 million equity and we want the ratio to be 30 to 70. If we buy out debt, we must repurchase 
$14.3 million to get to 70% equity, or $60 million out of $85.7 million total (for those who remember ninth 
grade algebra, we set 60/x equal to 70/100 and cross-multiply). If we add new equity, we would have to give 
our CEO more than twice as much, or $33.33 million. The $33.33 million is necessary to get to 70% equity: 
$93.3 million out of $133.33 million.  
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accounting. Whatever the reason, rebalancing adds to the costs of inside debt.  Even 
buyouts, if firms actually pursued them, would add to the transaction costs of incentive 
pay. Another implication of rebalancing is that it leads to ever more complex pay 
structures. This piling of multiple layers of compensation has implications for the 
efficacy of any one incentive, as we detail in the next Part.   
IV. A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF COGNITIVELY COMPLEX PAY PACKAGES 
Another major reason we are skeptical of the usefulness of paying managers with 
the firm’s debt is that it is unclear whether such pay actually leads managers to protect 
the interests of creditors. Typically, a firm that uses some inside debt also pays the 
manager using a mix of salary, stock, options of varying values and exercise dates, and 
other perquisites and benefits.132 The manager also has her personal reputation at 
stake.133 Taken together, the manager’s net bundle of compensation represents a widely 
varying set of risks, rewards, and incentives. 
The psychological literature suggests that complexity of such a degree is often  
overwhelming even to the most sophisticated economic actors. As the complexity of 
human decisions increases, our ability to make good decisions, or even to make decisions 
at all, comes increasingly under stress. Managers are not immune to this phenomenon, 
and may even be especially vulnerable to it. As a result, adding various forms of inside 
debt to a manager’s pay portfolio may simply increase the randomness of her decisions. 
To make a case for that view, we must first review what is known about how 
humans respond to complex incentives in general. We then return to executives and 
inside debt. 
A. Bounded Rationality and Cognition 
Humans have a limited ability to carry out complex mental tasks. That limitation, in 
turn, circumscribes our responsiveness to outside incentives. As Herbert Simon put it, we 
are “boundedly rational”—we can maximize our own self-interest, but only within the 
limits of our ability to understand what that self-interest entails.134 One way of modeling 
these limits is to suppose that cognition is costly or time consuming, making it a scarce 
resource whose consumption must be balanced against other potential gains and 
losses.135 
If decision making is itself a scarce resource, then it follows that decision makers 
will economize on decisions. If the gains from a large investment in decision effort are 
small, it might be better not to decide.136 Alternatively, as Simon suggests, the decider 
 
 132.  See infra Part VIII (providing a statistical overview of CEO compensation of large publicly traded 
firms). 
 133.  David Hirshleifer & Anjan V. Thakor, Managerial Conservatism, Project Choice, and Debt, 5 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 437, 437–70 (1992).  
 134.  Herbert Simon, Invariants of Human Behavior, 41 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 6 (1990). 
 135.  JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 54 (3d ed. 2000); Hans Gottinger, Computational Costs 
and Bounded Rationality, in STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 223, 223–24 (Wolfgang Stegmuller et al. 
eds., 1982); John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 669, 671 (1996); Roy Radner, 
Bounded Rationality, Indeterminacy, and the Theory of the Firm, 106 ECON. J. 1360, 1363 (1996).  
 136.  Eirik G. Furubotn, The New Institutional Economics and the Theory of the Firm, 45 J. ECON. BEHAV. 
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might “satisfice,” or make some decision that is cheaper than a full analysis but good 
enough to exclude the worst possible outcomes.137 
Though so far we have framed bounded rationality as itself the result of a fully 
rational cost-benefit analysis, there is also extensive evidence that humans engage in 
“satisficing” behavior unconsciously, as part of the brain’s effort to reconcile the 
demands of decisions with its own limited capacity.138 Most readers are likely familiar 
with the concept of “heuristics,” or mental shortcuts, that humans use in order to reach 
acceptable decisions under a state of incomplete information.139 For instance, we often 
assume that the status quo is right, that the information that is readily available to our 
conscious mind is the information we need to make a decision, and that the proper scope 
of the factors that influence a decision are the ones we can hold in our heads at one 
time.140 The literature typically describes these effects as the status quo bias, the 
availability bias, and the framing effect, respectively.141 We are also highly attached to 
the first conclusion we reach, a phenomenon known as “anchoring.”142 
As the rational choice model suggests, the more demands we put on our brains, the 
larger a role satisficing and heuristics play in our decisions.143 Many studies report that 
the brain is distracted by multi-tasking, and operates at lower efficiency for each 
additional task it is assigned.144 When experimental subjects face complicated sets of 
incentives, they tend to rely only on the most important.145 Time pressure increases 
subjects’ reliance on heuristics.146 In some cases, as the demands of decision grow larger, 
 
& ORG. 133, 137–38, 143 (2001); cf. George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 
213–25 (1961) (modeling optimal investment in search for information). 
 137.  Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 104 (1955); see Simon, 
supra note 134, at 9 (explaining heuristic search and describing satisficing as a “weak method,” which “[uses] 
experience to construct an expectation of how good a solution we might reasonably achieve, and halt[s] search 
as soon as a solution is reached that meets the expectation”). 
 138.  Simon, supra note 134, at 9–10. 
 139.  Id. at 9; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 27 
SCI. 1124, 1224–31 (1974). For Kahneman’s accessible summary, see Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded 
Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1449–70 (2003). 
 140.  Kahneman, supra note 139, at 1458–59; David Laibson & Richard Zeckhauser, Amos Tversky and the 
Ascent of Behavioral Economics, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 9–14 (1998). 
 141.  Kahneman, supra note 139, at 1449; Laibson & Zeckhauser, supra note 140, at 9–14. 
 142.  BARON, supra note 135, at 375–76, 468; Laibson & Zeckhauser, supra note 140, at 23–24. 
 143.  RICHARD THALER, QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS 3–5 (1994); Stanley F. Biggs et al., The Effects of 
Task Size and Similarity on the Decision Behavior of Bank Loan Officers, 31 MGMT. SCI. 970, 974–76 (1985); 
Furubotn, supra note 136, at 143; Ellen C. Garbarino & Julie A. Edell, Cognitive Effort, Affect, and Choice, 24 
J. CONSUMER RES. 147, 148 (1997); see Kahneman, supra note 139, at 1463, 1467 (reporting connection 
between time pressure or multiple tasks and mental errors); Hean Tat Keh et al., Opportunity Evaluation Under 
Risky Conditions: The Cognitive Processes of Entrepreneurs, ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC., Winter 
2002, at 125, 127 (tying entrepreneurial use of heuristics to lack of information and short period for decisions). 
 144.  BARON, supra note 135, at 215–16; Daniel T. Gilbert & Randall E. Osborne, Thinking Backward: 
Some Curable and Incurable Consequences of Cognitive Busyness, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 940, 
940 (1989). 
 145.  Eldar Shafir et al., Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNITION 11, 33 (1993); Paul Slovic, Choice Between 
Equally Valued Alternatives, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUMAN PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 280, 280–
87 (1975); Amos Tversky et al., Contingent Weighting in Judgment and Choice, 95 PSYCHOL. REV. 371, 372–
84 (1988). 
 146.  BARON, supra note 135, at 215–16; Kahneman, supra note 139, at 1463, 1467. 
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we may abandon choice altogether.147 
B. Bounded Rationality and Investment Decisions 
Although the literature we have just reviewed is extremely familiar to scholars of 
behavioral economics, it has so far never been applied directly to the question of the 
efficacy of incentive-based compensation. There is, though, a fairly near analogue: the 
behavior of individuals managing their own household portfolio. 
Evidence from household finance and other consumer decisions suggests that the 
transaction costs of discerning one’s own financial self-interest are very substantial, and 
that as a result, consumers sometimes avoid making important decisions.148 Household 
investors are overwhelmed by complexity.149 Planning for retirement is a very difficult 
task; the household has to decide how risk seeking it will be based on its projected needs, 
its current resources, the available set of current and future investments, inflation, and 
similar factors.150 Not surprisingly, then, researchers find that the larger the set of options 
for retirement investments, the less likely an average worker is to choose any of them at 
all.151 Moving beyond investment products, many studies find that as the number of 
complex options increases, the less likely consumers are to choose any one of them.152 
 
 147.  Simona Botti & Sheena S. Iyengar, The Dark Side of Choice: When Choice Impairs Social Welfare, 
25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 24, 26–27 (2006). 
 148.  Shlomo Benartzi & Richard Thaler, Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behavior, 21 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 81, 82–84 (2007); Hersh Shefrin, Behavioralizing Finance, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS FIN. 1, 25–26 
(2009).  
 149.  See Conlisk, supra note 135, at 672 (summarizing other studies on inability of households to plan 
their finances); Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, How Ordinary Consumers Make Complex Economic 
Decisions: Financial Literacy and Retirement Readiness 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 15350, Sept. 2009), available at www.nber.org/papers/w15350.pdf?new_window=1 (reporting survey 
evidence that households are poorly prepared to make the complex financial decisions they regularly face). For 
an accessible overview, see Troy Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for 
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 439–44 (2003). 
 150.  Lans Bovenberg et al., Saving and Investing over the Life Cycle and the Role of Collective Pension 
Funds, 155 DE ECONOMIST 347, 369 (2007); Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 149, at 4. 
 151.  Sheena S. Iyengar et al., How Much Choice Is Too Much: Determinants of Individual Contributions in 
401K Retirement Plans, in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 83, 
83–97 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Steven Utkus eds., 2004). Similarly, researchers find a familiarity effect, in which 
workers are more likely to participate in a retirement plan if it offers an option to invest in “known” investments 
such as the company’s stock. Gur Huberman et al., Defined Contribution Pension Plans: Determinants of 
Participation and Contribution Rates, 31 J. FIN. SERVICE RES. 1, 3 (2007). 
 152.  John T. Gourville & Dilip Soman, Overchoice and Assortment Type: When and Why Variety 
Backfires, 24 MARKETING SCI. 382, 386–93 (2005) (using microwaves, cameras, and golf balls as test subjects); 
Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good 
Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 995, 995–1004 (2000) (using jam). See generally Marianne 
Bertrand et al., What’s Psychology Worth? A Field Experiment in the Consumer Credit Market (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11892, Dec. 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11892 
(describing credit offers for consumers). The problem is not limited to consumers. See, e.g., Donald A. 
Redelmeier & Eldar Shafir, Medical Decision Making in Situations That Offer Multiple Alternatives, 273 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 302, 302–05 (1995) (finding that physicians were sometimes unable to make any treatment 
recommendation when irrelevant alternative choices were presented together with simpler decisions); Roger 
Simnett, The Effect of Information Selection, Information Processing, and Task Complexity on Predictive 
Accuracy of Auditors, 21 ACCT., ORG. & SOC’Y 699, 705–17 (1996) (testing subjects by providing financial 
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Complex decision settings also increase households’ reliance on heuristics. The 
larger the menu of choices consumers face, the more likely they are to use a shortcut, 
such as focusing only on the most prominent of several important aspects of choice, or to 
rely on irrelevant information.153 In studies of consumer purchases, for example, 
introducing more options made consumers more likely to shift their choice from 
extremes, such as the cheapest option, to “compromise” choices, such as the second 
cheapest. Rather than thinking about which was the best option, they just took a shortcut 
and split the difference, even if the new option was irrelevant to their choice.154 
Similarly, as retirement options proliferate, employees are more likely to stick with 
whatever the default “status quo” option their firm provides them, or with a very simple 
plan.155 For complicated financial products, such as credit cards and mortgages, 
consumers tend to focus only on one or two of the most salient, or available features, 
such as the annual rate, and neglect many other important details such as hidden fees.156 
Procrastination can also explain many of the observed outcomes.157 Given the high 
stakes in many of these decisions, a pure rational choice framework poorly explains why 
households are not expending more effort on their choices.158 There is extensive 
evidence, though, that humans tend to excessively weigh costs and benefits in the present 
and very near future at the expense of those that are more distant.159 Thus, the time and 
mental effort of choosing a retirement plan looms much larger than the budget crunch one 
 
profiles for 30 companies to each of them); Doug Snowball, Some Effects of Accounting Expertise and 
Information Load: An Empirical Study, 5 ACCT., ORG. & SOC’Y 323, 329–35 (1980) (testing subjects with 
different accounting expertise). 
 153.  Barbara E. Kahn & Jonathan Baron, An Exploratory Study of Choice Rules Favored for High-Stakes 
Decisions, 4 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 305, 306–07, 314, 324–26 (1995); Shafir et al., supra note 145, at 21–26; 
Amos Tversky & Eldar Shafir, Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of Deferred Decision, 3 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
358, 358–61 (1992).  
 154.  Joel Huber & Christopher Puto, Market Boundaries and Product Choice: Illustrating Attraction and 
Substitution Effects, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 31, 40 (1983); Shafir et al., supra note 145, at 25; Itamar Simonson, 
The Effect of Product Assortment on Buyer Preferences, 75 J. RETAILING 347, 348–70 (1999) (surveying the 
marketing literature). 
 155.  Sheena S. Iyengar & Emir Kamenica, Choice Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking, and Asset Allocation, 
94 J. PUB. ECON. 530, 532–39 (2010); Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia 
in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149, 1178–79 (2001).  
 156.  Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 
50, 75–76 (1991); Paul S. Calem & Loretta J. Mester, Consumer Behavior and the Stickiness of Credit Card 
Interest Rates, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1327, 1327 (1995); Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Contract 
Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence, 119 Q.J. ECON. 353, 377–79 (2004); David B. Gross & 
Nicholas S. Souleles, Do Liquidity Constraints and Interest Rates Matter for Consumer Behavior? Evidence 
from Credit Card Data, 117 Q.J. ECON. 149, 171 (2002). 
 157.  Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Procrastination in Preparing for Retirement, in BEHAVIORAL 
DIMENSIONS OF RETIREMENT ECONOMICS 125, 125–26 (Henry J. Aaron ed., 1999); Yvonne McCarthy, 
Behavioural Characteristics and Financial Distress 33 (European Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 1303, Feb. 
2011), available at www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1303.pdf (finding evidence that “an individual’s 
capacity for self-control, planning, and patience” helps determine which households get into financial 
difficulty). For an introduction to the theory of procrastination, see Brian Galle & Manuel Utset, Is Cap-and-
Trade Fair to the Poor? Shortsighted Households and the Timing of Consumption Taxes, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 33, 63–68 (2010). 
 158.  Kahneman, supra note 139, at 1468. 
 159.  For evidence in the financial decision context, see Madrian & Shea, supra note 155, at 1172–73. 
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will face at retirement from choosing the wrong plan.160 
Procrastination can actually be more acute for important decisions.161 A significant 
component of our incentive to procrastinate is our belief that our future self will carry out 
the task—in essence, we free ride on our future selves.162 When the stakes are large 
enough, it becomes more likely that our future self will do the burdensome task and 
therefore becomes more “rational” to free ride. At the same time, larger stakes increase 
the amount of effort it is rational to exert, increasing our desire to free ride.163 But the 
future self, when the time comes, reaches the same conclusion and also procrastinates. Of 
course, our present self should anticipate this bad behavior by the future self and refuse to 
free ride. Unfortunately, evidence also suggests we are extremely bad at forecasting our 
own willpower; we tend to believe (often wrongly) we will be more resolute in the future 
when the “deadline” is closer.164 
“Bolstering” behavior offers another reason biases may persist even when stakes are 
high.165 Psychologists suggest that we tend to hold on to or “anchor” on our first 
impressions.  Indeed, psychologists attribute anchoring in large part to our unwillingness 
to admit to ourselves that we were wrong and to avoid the accompanying feelings of 
inner conflict and self-doubt.166 Admitting we were wrong undermines our self-esteem 
and creates internal tension with our earlier decision.167 The more that is at stake, the 
worse these conflicts feel, leading us to devote more effort to stamping out inconsistent 
or discomforting thoughts and doubts.168 
C. Bounded Rationality and Complex Pay 
Executive decisions about complex pay strongly resemble these kinds of household 
finance decisions. Like a household planning for retirement, an executive receiving 
incentive-based pay must make a complex decision about how risk seeking she should be, 
given the makeup of her portfolio of investments, her tolerance for risk, and her 
expectations for the future.169 Suppose an executive with a pay package that attempts to 
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from the United States, in SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 167, 182–84 (Jeffrey 
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align her incentives with (in rough order of decreasing risk preferences) shareholders, 
short-term unsecured creditors, long-term unsecured creditors, and long-term secured 
creditors.170 She must choose projects for the firm that will maximize her expected 
return, given that each of those segments of her pay will have a different expected payoff 
depending on the amount of risk she chooses for the firm. 
We are not aware of any direct studies of how executives manage pay complexity, 
but there is substantial indirect evidence to support our hypothesis. In experiments, 
executives show a tendency to balk at complex decisions, much as ordinary consumers 
do.171 Real-world evidence suggests that managers use a number of simplifying “rules of 
thumb” to economize on decision costs, such as setting arbitrary targets for firm leverage, 
using short time horizons to set various firm targets, and taking shortcuts on calculating 
present values of future results.172 Survey studies of CEOs find that many report relying 
on their gut to make important decisions, or use the framing or general reliability of the 
source of advice as a proxy for whether to follow the advice.173 Additionally, a great 
number of studies find that CEOs are overconfident in their choices of projects.174 
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thumb for capital structure and investment hurdles); C.V. Helliar et al., Managerial “Irrationality” in Financial 
Decision Making, 31 MANAGERIAL FIN. 1, 1–11 (2005); Keh et al., supra note 143, at 136–38 (reporting 
illusion of control and belief in law of small numbers); Tiwana et al., supra note 169, at 161–62, 167, 171 
(finding that managers rely on shortcuts such as net present value and do not consider other aspects of 
investment choices). 
 173.  Peter Bryant, Self-Regulation and Decision Heuristics in Entrepreneurial Opportunity Evaluation and 
Exploitation, 45 MGMT. DECISION 732, 737–39 (2007) (discussing gut decisions and trust of other party); Sarah 
Kaplan, Framing Contests: Strategy Making Under Uncertainty, 19 ORG. SCI. 729, 729–30, 736–45 (2008) 
(explaining managerial use of framing); see Cynthia Devers et al., The Effects of Endowment and Loss Aversion 
in Managerial Stock Option Valuation, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 191, 203 (2007) (reporting laboratory study in 
which participating executives responded strongly to framing of gains and losses for stock options). 
 174.  Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach, 89 
AM. ECON. REV. 306, 306, 314–15 (1999); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? 
CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 20, 42 (2008); Edward J. Zajac & Max H. 
Bazerman, Blind Spots in Industry and Competitor Analysis: Implications of Interfirm (Mis)perceptions for 
Strategic Decisions, 16 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 37, 37–47 (1991); Jayanthi Sunder et al., The Role of Managerial 
Overconfidence in the Design of Debt Covenants 3 (Mar. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
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Overconfidence closely resembles the anchoring effect in that once an actor fixes on a 
decision, it becomes psychologically difficult to change.175 
There is also a management literature devoted to studying how cognitive limitations 
impact the way top managers run their firms.176 These studies find that managers make 
decisions based on “subjective cognitive representations” of the firm’s situation.177 
Because it is not humanly possible to take in all the information that would be relevant to 
running a large firm, managers must choose a small subset of data to focus on.178 Often, 
though, managerial focus seems to be driven by events and firm procedures, rather than 
being the product of deliberate choice: managers deal with what’s on their plate, and  
don’t have time to think about the next course.179  Faster paced industries exaggerate this 
effect, shifting managerial attention away from long-range strategy.180 While this 
literature does not generally deal directly with the question of incentive pay, it is highly 
suggestive for our project.181 The implication is that managers, like everyone else, can be 
confounded by too much information. Piling even more demands on their cognition can 
shift their decision making in ways that are not necessarily conducive to top firm 
performance. 
If CEOs rely on heuristics and satisficing to make complex decisions, as the data 
suggest, then adding layers of incentive pay may have perverse effects. For example, as 
the CEO’s own self-interest becomes more and more difficult to calculate, she would be 
more likely to rely on mental shortcuts.182 Like the households and individual consumers 
in the studies we mentioned, when the menu of her portfolio becomes long enough, the 
present costs of assessing her own financial interest may become high enough that she 
procrastinates calculating it, and instead decides on the basis of her “gut” or her trusted 
 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1595007. 
 175.  BARON, supra note 135, at 191; see Keh et al., supra note 143, at 128 (connecting overconfidence to 
the availability heuristic); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why 
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 142–
43, 147 (1997) (describing the “optimism-commitment ‘whipsaw’”). 
 176.  Orly Levy et al., What We Talk About When We Talk About “Global Mindset”: Managerial 
Cognition in Multinational Corporations, 38 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 231, 232 (2007); Nadkarni & Barr, supra note 
169, at 1395; see FINKELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 169, at 44 (explaining that the theoretical groundwork for this 
literature is known as “the Carnegie School” after the affiliation of some of its early expositors).  
 177.  Nadkarni & Barr, supra note 169; see Vinay K. Garg et al., Chief Executive Scanning Emphases, 
Environmental Dynamism, and Manufacturing Firm Performance, 24 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 725, 725–44 (2003) 
(examining effects of limited executive cognition). 
 178.  Nadkarni & Barr, supra note 169, at 1397–98; see also Stephen Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group 
Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2002) (connecting limited executive 
cognitive power to firms’ practice of limiting direct information flows to senior management). 
 179.  Levy et al., supra note 176, at 245–58 (reviewing other studies); Nadkarni & Barr, supra note 169, at 
1398, 1413–19; William Ocasio, Towards an Attention-Based View of the Firm, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 187, 
195–205 (1997). 
 180.  William C. Bogner & Pamela S. Barr, Making Sense in Hypercompetitive Environments: A Cognitive 
Explanation for the Persistence of High Velocity Competition, 11 ORG. SCI. 212, 213–25 (2000). 
 181.  For a source that deals directly with incentive pay, see Sarah Kaplan & Rebecca Henderson, Inertia 
and Incentives: Bridging Organizational Economics and Organizational Theory, 16 ORG. SCI. 509, 511–19 
(2005), which discusses the role of cognition and inter-personal relationships in the ways that firms can 
motivate line employees. 
 182.  See Furubotn, supra note 136, at 136 (explaining that transaction costs constrain executive searches 
for best solution). 
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advisors. Heuristics can also lead managers to the wrong conclusions. Managers who fail 
to assess risks accurately might think they are responding to their incentives to take a 
certain amount of risk but actually greatly under- or overshoot.183 Adding new pay 
instruments, then, can reduce the efficacy of all of the instruments. 
Existing research on incentives also suggests that availability bias is another likely 
outcome of adding layers of incentive-based pay. In lab tests, subjects offered a financial 
incentive to maximize one aspect of their task are so focused on the reward that their 
performance on other mental tasks, especially tasks involving creativity and problem 
solving, declines significantly.184 Explicit incentives have been found in many settings to 
“crowd out” intrinsic motivations—for instance, imposing a fine for picking children up 
late from daycare increased the amount of lateness.185 As a result, it is possible that 
executives will be excessively sensitive to the largest or otherwise most salient 
component of their pay. Adding new incentives for the executive may not change her 
behavior at all, or may exacerbate her need to rely on heuristics. 
Admittedly, scholars do not yet know the cut-off for a cognitively manageable level 
of pay complexity. The fact that increased pay complexity moves us closer to the 
threshold would not be as troubling if the threshold were far away. However, the 
evidence we have surveyed on ordinary households is to the contrary. Most individuals 
are overwhelmed by tasks and information rather simpler than those the executive must 
digest. The household need plan only for its own future, while the executive must 
determine not only her own personal degree of risk preference and needs for savings and 
current consumption, but also calculate the impact her decision will have on each of the 
components of her pay portfolio, and then how those impacts interact with her 
preferences and needs.186 To be sure, the CEO is likely highly skilled at least at 
analyzing the firm’s performance. However, as discussed below, it is not clear that 
expertise is an advantage. 
D. Some Objections Considered 
There are several points that might be raised in response to our argument so far. For 
example, CEOs are obviously considerably more expert in financial matters than the 
 
 183.  Baker et al., supra note 172, at 168–71; see Colin Camerer & Don Lovallo, Overconfidence and 
Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306, 315 (1999) (making this point about 
overconfidence). 
 184.  John Condry & James Chambers, Intrinsic Motivation and the Process of Learning, in THE HIDDEN 
COSTS OF REWARDS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN MOTIVATION 61, 61–66 (Mark R. 
Lepper & David Green eds., 1978); see Stephanie J. Byram, Cognitive and Motivational Factors Influencing 
Time Prediction, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 216, 233 (1997) (reporting that financial incentives 
for speed of performance exacerbate biased performance).  
 185.  Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2–17 (2000); see also 
BARON, supra note 135, at 278–79 (describing other instances of crowding out). For overviews, see Camerer & 
Malmendier, supra note 172, at 243–44; Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. 
ECON. SURVS. 589, 599–600 (2001). Cf. James Y. Shah et al., Forgetting All Else: On the Antecedents and 
Consequences of Goal Shielding, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1261, 1261–80 (2002) (reporting 
multiple experiments in which participants appeared to close off attention to goals other than the one previously 
committed to). 
 186.  Tiwana et al., supra note 169, at 160–61; Radner, supra note 135, at 1361. 
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average household, and far more money rides on their decisions. It should therefore be 
rational for CEOs to devote more mental energy to their decisions, because they get a 
better return on their time. Similarly, CEOs have advisors and data to help them analyze 
their own financial interest. Even if some CEOs might be tempted to satisfice, market 
competition could spur them to try harder. While these are all possibilities, we think each 
of them unlikely. 
First, theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that expertise and big stakes can 
increase, rather than decrease, the use of shortcuts. Advanced financial skills will lower 
the costs of assessing the tradeoffs of any pay portfolio.187 However, procrastination and 
bolstering, as we have explained, are both more acute for important decisions, and there 
is little evidence that expertise mitigates either. Several leading economists, for instance, 
have reported their own and their colleagues’ failures to plan for personal retirement.188  
And CEOs, as we also have noted already, are especially prone to believe in their own 
competence; they are, therefore, rather more likely to bolster their own prior beliefs or 
expect that their future self will carry out an important task.189 
Advice from others is unlikely to remedy the satisficing problem in this context.190 
Managers must make many important risky corporate decisions under substantial time 
pressure.191 Corporate culture rewards decisiveness and self-confidence, and we doubt 
that any corporate leader wants to project the impression that she has to evaluate her own 
self-interest before making decisions for the firm.192 Thus, an executive could not easily 
call her financial advisor to ask how a proposed deal will impact her pension or her 
option portfolio; she will have to decide, likely having to take shortcuts that diminish or 
distort the efficacy of the incentive pay. 
In any event, as those who study firms have found, it is rare that advice from within 
the firm can move over-confident CEOs off of their own first impression.193 Groupthink 
and herd behavior often mark firms in which the internal culture rewards consensus. 
Managers of such firms may assume dissenting views are wrong because they depart 
from the “wisdom of crowds,” and going out on a limb with a different opinion sacrifices 
the opportunity to share blame with others if things go poorly.194 All humans tend to 
 
 187.  See Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 149, at 16 (finding that sophisticated financial knowledge 
positively impacts the likelihood that any retirement planning a household does will be accurate).  
 188.  Benartzi & Thaler, supra note 148, at 82, 84, 86; Laibson & Zeckhauser, supra note 140, at 23; 
O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 157, at 126; see also Bovenberg et al., supra note 150, at 372 (reporting 
evidence of widespread disinterest in pension planning, including among “more than 50% of a sample of highly 
educated wealthy individuals”). 
 189.  Cf. Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate 
Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 974 (2002) (noting that those with high 
self-esteem do not attribute bad outcomes to their own actions).  
 190.  But see Bainbridge, supra note 178, at 20–27 (suggesting that board or other group decisions can 
improve quality of cognitively limited executive decisions).  
 191.  Keh et al., supra note 143, at 127; see Nadkarni & Barr, supra note 169, at 1399 (describing settings 
in which managers do not have time to research decisions before making them). 
 192.  Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation, 117 Q.J. ECON. 871, 878 
(2002); Bryant, supra note 173, at 735; Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral 
Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 691, 699, 730 (2005). 
 193.  Langevoort, supra note 175, at 136–37. 
 194.  James D. Cox & Harvey Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal 
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selectively evaluate new information in a way that confirms our existing beliefs, and of 
course those of us who are over-confident do so even more than others.195 That makes 
the CEO resistant to advice.196 If not, advice from different counselors with varying 
personal goals and incentives may further muddy the waters and make it less likely the 
compensation scheme’s incentives will dominate. 
As for market discipline, it has not yet curtailed CEO overconfidence,197 and it 
seems unlikely to affect satisficing either. As Langevoort argues, firms may actually 
prefer over-confident managers for their ability to avoid “informational paralysis.”198  
This point could plausibly extend to managers who satisfice in other ways, as well.199 
We would add further to Langevoort’s story by noting that promotion tournaments 
among executives select executives who are excessively attentive to the largest 
component of their rewards. Those, after all, are the mid-tier managers who chase the 
carrot of promotion most vigorously, perhaps at the expense of other goals such as a 
healthy work and family balance.200 
Even if firms do not actively select for biases, there are a number of factors that 
blunt the impact of market pressures. Competition may squeeze satisficing managers only 
weakly because all firms satisfice.201 If not, to the extent that market discipline, such as 
the threat of firing for poor performance, is just another incentive, it is hardly surprising 
that adding new incentives does not change the problem that the executive is insensitive 
to incentives.202 Termination is rarely a serious worry for a CEO in any case.203 Board 
judgments to fire or discipline the manager rely on incomplete information doled by the 
manager, are subject to the board’s own biases, and can be compromised by close ties to 
the CEO.204 
 
Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 100–04 (1985); Langevoort, supra note 
175, at 138; Paredes, supra note 192, at 686–87. Bainbridge acknowledges this and other similar counter-
arguments to his views but suggests that advice on net still helps executives. Bainbridge, supra note 178, at 27–
31. 
 195.  BARON, supra note 135, at 195. 
 196.  Langevoort, supra note 175, at 136; see BARON, supra note 135, at 211–12 (describing how 
individuals selectively expose themselves only to confirming advice). 
 197.  Paredes, supra note 192, at 695; cf. Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 540, 561–63 (1994) (identifying several reasons why firms may not “evolve” towards optimal 
contracting).  
 198.  Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial 
Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 299–
302 (2004); see also Camerer & Malmendier, supra note 172, at 259 (claiming confidence may be correlated 
with many kinds of managerial value). 
 199.  For example, market selection for decisive managers is consistent with our procrastination story. In 
fact, procrastination may enable the manager to look more decisive because the manager puts off careful 
examination of the issues for later so she is able to act more quickly.  
 200.  Cf. Camerer & Malmendier, supra note 172, at 271–72 (noting that overconfident managers are easier 
to motivate through tournament rewards). But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who 
Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1632–33 (2005) (claiming that managers succeed because they internalize 
firm norms). 
 201.  Furubotn, supra note 136, at 144, 147; cf. Camerer & Malmendier, supra note 172, at 236 (claiming 
that there is no arbitrage market for betting against a biased CEO). 
 202.  Baker et al., supra note 172, at 168. 
 203.  Jensen & Murphy, supra note 1, at 238–42. 
 204.  Baker et al., supra note 172, at 168; Jayne W. Barnard, Narcissism, Over-Optimism, Fear, Anger, and 
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Finally, it could be argued that though adding debt-like pay options will not 
perfectly align managers’ actions with stakeholder interests, it surely must be an 
improvement over paying solely with equity.  In fact, we think that is unclear. As we 
explained, mental shortcuts and satisficing usually increase when complexity and 
decision costs rise.205 Using debt instruments may reduce executive sensitivity to all 
forms of incentives. Further, a very large debt-like payment might lead executives to 
focus solely on maximizing that portion of their portfolios, crowding other incentives, 
while if debt is too small relative to stock options, managers may simply ignore it. As 
Edmans and Liu note, because of the complex tradeoffs involved, the optimality of using 
debt compensation is highly sensitive to a close match between managerial pay and the 
creditor’s position.206 Rough approximations mean that debt compensation is less 
efficient than equity alone. We have argued, though, that rough approximations are likely 
the best case scenario. 
V.  EXISTING EVIDENCE OF DEBT COMPENSATION EFFICIENCY 
So far, we have offered mostly theoretical predictions of how complex bundles 
would perform, or evidence that bears only indirectly on inside debt. In this Part, we 
survey evidence from the existing literature on inside debt itself to see whether our 
predictions are borne out. The study of debt-like instruments as tools of managerial 
control is new, so the data are fairly thin, which is one reason we add our own findings in 
Part VI. Overall, the data gathered by others generally support our view, though there are 
certainly several studies that claim to find that debt-like instruments are efficient. We 
think, though, that the studies finding efficient results are flawed, mostly because they are 
misspecified: they fail to fully consider alternative and important rival explanations, or 
otherwise look only at a piece of the relevant data.207 
First, we should explain that evidence to date on debt compensation has focused 
mostly on pensions and deferred compensation. As we have mentioned, it is currently 
unheard of for U.S. firms to pay their executives with true debt. Again, theorists argue 
that pensions and deferred compensation can align managerial incentives with debt 
holders in much the same way as payments of stock align incentives with equity 
investors.208 
There is some evidence at a minimum that pensions change CEO behavior. 
Sundaram and Yermack, using their formula for deriving pre-2007 pension balances, 
found lower risks of sliding towards bankruptcy among firms whose executives had 
 
Depression: The Interior Lives of Corporate Leaders, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 426–27 (2008); Renee M. Jones, 
Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA 
L. REV. 105, 134–35 (2006); Langevoort, supra note 198, at 293. 
 205.  See supra Parts IV.A–B.  
 206.  Edmans & Liu, supra note 3, at 91; see also Walker, supra note 13, at 243 (“Optimal equity 
compensation design is quite sensitive to model specification . . . . ”). 
 207.  See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 133–34 (6th ed. 2008) (explaining consequences 
of failure to include relevant variables in regression). 
 208.  Edmans & Gabaix, supra note 14, at 492–93; Frederick Tung & Xue Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt 
Compensation, and the Global Financial Crisis 2, 4 (Sept. 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1570161. 
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larger pension balances at risk.209 Tung and Wang report similarly that banks whose 
CEOs had large inside debt positions performed better during the financial crisis, 
suggesting that the firm had taken less risky positions before and during the crisis.210 
Endogeneity is a serious question for these studies, though.211 As Tung and Wang 
acknowledge, both the choice of compensation and the choice of firm risk could be 
caused by a risk-averse CEO, so that observing that the two happen together could be 
evidence of that shared causation and not evidence that one causes the other.212 Risk-
averse executives might choose to be paid in debt-like instruments because they are more 
certain to pay out, and of course those CEOs would also pursue safer firm investments. 
We add that another possible common cause of pensions and low-risk outcomes is a 
firm’s risk-averse institutional culture.213 
Tung and Wang’s attempt to explain away this possible endogeneity story is not 
fully persuasive. They suggest that if risk aversion explains both outcomes, we should 
observe a correlation between risky bets and CEO debt prior to the crisis, and they find 
no such correlation.214 That test is problematic, though, because as the duo report 
elsewhere in their manuscript, CEOs only appear to care about the security of their inside 
debt portfolios when a crisis is imminent.215 If so, even a risk-averse CEO would not 
necessarily demand compensation comprised mostly of pension and cash when the firm is 
performing well. We then could not draw strong conclusions from the fact that we do not 
see a correlation between pay and the riskiness of a firm’s bets pre-crisis.216 
Other studies attempt to analyze whether inside debt can benefit the firm by 
reducing the price of borrowing or the restrictions borrowers impose on the firm to 
protect their investment. Two recent papers report that firms with significant CEO 
pensions have lower borrowing costs or face fewer covenants.217 Two other studies find 
 
 209.  Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 6, at 1581–83. 
 210.  Tung & Wang, supra note 208, at 3–4. 
 211.  “Endogeneity” is a statistician’s term for the possibility that the direction of causation assumed by the 
statistical model is incorrect; technically, it describes any situation in which the measured variable is correlated 
with the estimated errors. GREENE, supra note 207, at 11. This may be the result of the dependent variable—the 
outcome that is being predicted—in fact causing the factors we are using to analyze it. An example would be 
trying to predict why the sun rises, and concluding that it is caused in part by roosters crowing; there is a strong 
correlation, but our researcher has the causation story backwards. Another form of endogeneity can result from 
omitting a variable from the model that jointly causes both the dependent variable and the explanatory variable. 
An example could be a researcher observing a correlation between SAT scores and salary and concluding that 
employers pay high-scorers more; in fact, both are likely related to underlying intelligence or social capital.  
 212.  Tung & Wang, supra note 208, at 26; see also John R. Graham et al., Managerial Attitudes and 
Corporate Actions 3 (May 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=1432641 (reporting their findings suggesting that CEOs choose firms whose compensation 
practices match their own risk preferences). 
 213.  Cf. Graham et al., supra note 212, at 1 (noting managers may be selected for fit with firm culture). For 
a discussion of how firm culture develops and influences organizational decisions, see KARL E. WEICK, 
MAKING SENSE OF THE ORGANIZATION 284–307 (2001); Camerer & Malmendier, supra note 172, at 254–58. 
 214.  Tung & Wang, supra note 208, at 26. 
 215.  Id. at 24–25.  
 216.  We suggest that, to refine this measure, future researchers might examine correlation between inside 
debt at firms close to bankruptcy and the riskiness of the firm’s bets.  
 217.  Feng Chen et al., Executive Inside Debt Holdings and Creditors’ Demand for Pricing and Non-Pricing 
Protections 3 (Sept. 30, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www-2.rotman.utoronto.ca/ 
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that firms with higher amounts of debt tend also to have CEOs who receive a higher 
portion of their compensation via their pension, which is consistent with the idea that 
firms believe pensions facilitate borrowing.218 
A difficulty with these studies is that they do not clearly rule out an alternative story 
in which the use of pensions is the product of managerial power rather than efforts to 
design efficient debt contracts.219 As we described earlier, the managerial power 
hypothesis suggests that influential managers will use pensions and deferred 
compensation as a way of hiding outsized pay and downside protection from their 
monitors. High debt, we believe, can contribute to managerial power. As we discussed 
previously, shareholders watch their managers less closely when creditor investment in 
the firm grows.220 Yet unlike the shareholders, the creditors nominally have equal or 
superior claims on the firm’s residual assets as the managers.221 A creditor therefore has 
little reason (unless bankruptcy is imminent and firm assets are limited) to care about the 
size of the manager’s compensation, except to the extent that the raw amount of 
compensation affects managerial incentives.222 So larger debt may result in lower 
monitoring of total CEO pay. 
Our account explains not only the correlation between amount of debt and pensions 
but also the correlation between cost of debt and pensions. Greater creditor investment, 
we argue, gives a freer hand to managerial rent seeking in the form of excess 
compensation. Moreover, firms who can borrow more easily or more cheaply are likely 
to borrow more, so our theory also predicts a positive correlation between ease of 
borrowing and large CEO pension payouts. 
There is some evidence already in favor of our managerial power story. Cen, though 
he uses only a single simple indicator of managerial power (whether the CEO is chairman 
 
userfiles/departments/accounting/File/inside%20debt%20contracting%200930.pdf; Wang et al., supra note 118, 
at 1. 
 218.  Joseph Gerakos, CEO Pensions: Disclosure, Managerial Power, and Optimal Contracting 4 (Pension 
Research Council, Working Paper No. 2007-5, Jan. 16, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=982180; Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 6, at 1574–75. 
 219.  Sundaram & Yermack report using board size, percent of outside directors, CEO term in office, 
whether CEO belongs to the founding family, and percentage of institutional ownership as measures of 
managerial power. Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 6, at 1573. We identify several other important measures 
in the literature. See infra note 243 and accompanying text (identifying other explanatory variables, including 
the structure and gender profile of the board of directors). 
 220.  See Whitehead, supra note 42, at 72 (explaining mechanisms that allow other investors to rely on 
creditor monitoring). This story may be less true to the extent that shareholder interests are contrary to those of 
creditors. For example, a large shareholder would not likely free ride on creditor efforts to control managerial 
risk taking.  
 221.  See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2006) (granting unsecured priority to wages earned within 180 days prior 
to bankruptcy, but only to a maximum of roughly $11 thousand). 
 222.  Some might argue that shareholders, realizing the weak incentives of managers to monitor total 
compensation, will continue to watch over managerial compensation themselves. Shareholder free riding is still 
likely to increase, though, because compensation is only one aspect of managerial behavior. Managers must also 
have incentives to work hard, to serve investors and not their own ego, and so on. Because creditors provide 
monitoring along most of these other dimensions, equity investors need not. Many of these monitoring efforts—
reading the annual report, for example—might also produce information about CEO compensation. Thus, at a 
minimum, free riding on creditors reduces the extent to which shareholders learn about compensation as 
incidental to their other monitoring efforts.  
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of the board), finds that this instrument has significant explanatory power for the portion 
of a CEO’s compensation paid through pensions and deferred compensation.223 Kalyta 
and Magnan, and Goh and Li find correlations between pensions and managerial power 
in small samples from Canada and Great Britain, respectively.224 Gerakos also finds 
some evidence that instruments for managerial power correlate with pension size, but that 
the effects are small.225 We are somewhat skeptical of his results, however, because he 
examines the determinants of pension size rather than the portion of compensation paid 
as pension.226 Because he appears to neglect factors that tend to increase pay overall, 
such as firm size and complexity,227 he underestimates the relative contribution of 
managerial power to the choice of compensation form.228 Gerakos also uses a small one-
year sample of 174 firms, which is a tiny enough slice of the market to leave room to 
doubt whether his findings would still be true of the market as a whole—a question we 
consider next in Part VI. 
Additionally, though perhaps less significantly, the finance literature has 
misunderstood the role of tax in these decisions. A highly leveraged firm has stronger 
incentives to use deferred compensation. As tax law scholars have explained, deferred 
compensation is most likely to be on net tax-advantage when the firm’s marginal tax rate 
is lower than the rate of the manager being paid.229 Interest payments are deductible, and 
so reduce the effective rate facing the firm.230 We therefore predict, purely as a tax 
matter, that higher debts as a portion of firm value would lead to higher inside debt. 
Whether cheaper debt would also inflate inside debt is ambiguous; the lower cost would 
reduce the tax savings from interest but also probably lead to more debt overall, and it is 
unclear which effect would dominate. 
Sundaram and Yermack do try to control for a firm’s tax status, but they do so 
 
 223.  Wei Cen, The Determinants of CEO Inside Debt and Its Components 32 (Jan. 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at papers.ssrn.com/5013/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1716306. 
 224.  Paul Kalyta & Michel Magnan, Executive Pensions, Disclosure Quality, and Rent Extraction, 27 J. 
ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 133, 135 (2008); Lisa Goh & Yong Li, Executive Pensions and Excess Compensation 6–7 
(Sept. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://research.mbs.ac.uk/accounting-finance/Portals/0/ 
docs/2010/ExecutivePensionsandExcessCompensation.pdf.  
 225.  Gerakos, supra note 218, at 25–28. 
 226.  Id. at 14–15. 
 227.  For a review of research on the relationship between firm size and CEO pay, see Tosi et al., supra 
note 26, at 307–29 (finding that firm size explains 40% of variance in CEO pay). 
 228.  Gerakos, supra note 218, at 16–19 (describing research design). For evidence on the determinants of 
the amount of executive compensation, see Kevin Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF 
LABOR ECONOMICS 2485, 2485–563 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999); Sydney Finkelstein & 
Donald C. Hambrick, Chief Executive Compensation: A Study of the Intersection of Markets and Political 
Processes, 10 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 121, 121–34 (1989) (examining the effect of “managerial power, the role of 
the board of directors, firm complexity, and human capital” on CEO compensation). 
 229.  Halperin, supra note 44; Gregg Polsky & Ethan Yale, Reforming the Taxation of Deferred 
Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 571, 576–79 (2007); David I. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax 
Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 695, 737–39 (2004). When measured on a risk-neutral basis, this advantage is 
smaller. Ethan Yale, Investment Risk and the Tax Benefit of Deferred Compensation, 62 TAX L. REV. 377, 382–
94 (2009). 
 230.  26 U.S.C. § 163 (2006). To be clear, the greatest tax advantages accrue when the firm’s marginal rate 
is lower than the employee’s, so that interest deductions will only generate these benefits when they are large 
enough to drop the firm into a lower tax bracket. 
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inaccurately. Their study asks only whether a firm has carry-forward losses for the year—
in other words, whether it has so many losses that it paid no tax at all, and so has a 
marginal rate of zero.231 But pensions and deferred compensation contracts are written 
years before the corresponding benefits are actually paid. The proper control would be 
the firm’s expectations of its future marginal rate at the time the contract is signed, not 
the marginal rate in the year of payment.232 
Even if all these other questions could be answered satisfactorily, it would still be 
unclear whether existing studies have shown that inside debt is efficient. None of the 
papers even purport to measure any of the additional costs of complex compensation 
described here. Taking them at full face value, they show that inside debt can reduce the 
cost of borrowing. It remains possible that the total cost to the firm is greater than this 
savings. Indeed, as mentioned, the short-term market reaction to disclosures of inside 
debt was that the value of equity dropped by more than the increase in the value of firm 
debt.233 Admittedly, we should expect some drop in equity value even if inside debt is 
efficient.234 But the study finds that equity lost more value than creditors gained, 
implying that equity markets may view inside debt as destroying firm value over and 
above any simple transfer of value from shareholders to bond holders.235 
Given these many open questions, there is room for additional investigation into the 
workings of inside debt. In Part VI, we examine some of our rival explanations for the 
relation between borrowing and inside debt, using a large database of publicly traded 
firms. 
VI. ORIGINAL EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON PENSIONS AND DEFERRED COMPENSATION 
This Part summarizes the results of our original empirical investigation into the 
reasons firms use inside debt as compensation. To briefly preview the result, we find little 
evidence that current borrowing needs explain firms’ use of inside debt, but considerable 
evidence that inside debt is predicted by known markers of managerial power and by the 
risk preferences of the firm’s directors. These findings tend to undermine the suggestions 
by others that firms have chosen to use inside debt because it is efficient. 
It is difficult to directly test the efficiency of inside debt. As we have argued, studies 
examining the impact of executive pay structures on borrowing costs or borrowing terms 
do not tell the full picture.236 Market reactions to disclosure of those structures add more 
information, but outsiders may themselves have only an incomplete picture of how 
 
 231.  Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 6, at 1573–74. 
 232.  In addition, the Sundaram & Yermack controls fail to account for firms that may have a marginal rate 
between zero and the maximum individual rate. But because corporate rates are steeply progressive and then 
quickly plateau, see 26 U.S.C. § 11(b) (2006), that omission likely does not miss many firms.  
 233.  Chayang Wei & David Yermack, Investor Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt Incentives, FED. RESERVE 
BD. NO. 445, at 23, 31 (2011), available at papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.ctm?abstract_id=1604046. 
 234.  Without inside debt, the efficiency argument goes, managers take too many risks, shifting value away 
from creditors with fixed claims on the firm to shareholders with a stake in the upside. Whitehead, supra note 
42, at 73. Taking away this incentive for excessive risk should increase the expected value of a creditor 
position, but reduce expected value for the equity holders by an equal amount.  
 235.  An alternative explanation, as we’ve mentioned, is that traders interpreted the disclosure as evidence 
of managerial power and adjusted expectations for the firm accordingly.  
 236.  See supra Part V. 
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managers are responding to incentives. 
Examining the firm’s own decisions, then, may be the best window we have into the 
ultimate efficacy of inside debt. Directors of the firm, in particular, are responsible for 
direct supervision of its managers, interact with them repeatedly, and are at least in theory 
privy to all the firm’s data.237 Rational representatives of the firm’s owners would choose 
the most efficient method for reducing the agency costs of debt.238 Inside debt 
proponents claim that if directors choose to use inside debt in order to contain the agency 
costs of borrowing, that would be powerful evidence in favor of the efficient contracting 
theory.239 Directors’ motive for using inside debt is also an important piece of evidence 
in the debate over managerial power, as we explained previously.240 
Thus, to test the theories we have offered so far, we turn to examining the 
determinants of firms’ use of inside debt compensation. We argued in the last Part that 
the existing evidence on the reasons firms choose to use inside debt is inconclusive. We 
claimed that studies so far have failed fully to consider whether firms might be using 
pensions and deferred compensation for reasons unrelated to current borrowing costs. In 
order to test our rival hypotheses, we assembled a data set of more than 1300 large 
publicly traded firms spanning a period of seven years. We then conducted a series of 
econometric analyses of our data. We explain the construction of the data set and our 
methods in detail in a methodological appendix. 
First, we investigated the basic question whether firms that use pensions or deferred 
compensation also have current long-term debt obligations. We found that the average 
pension balance for the 102 firm-years in our sample with zero current long-term debt 
and an active CEO pension account was more than $2.7 million.241 CEOs observed 
during the 217 firm-years with deferred compensation plans but no long-term debt 
averaged $1.1 million in total deferred compensation balances.242 Even these simple 
outcomes, we suggest, are a challenging result for efficient contracting theories of inside 
debt. If the firm has no long-term debt of its own, why is it promising more than $3 
million in inside debt with a long time horizon? 
We then attempted to identify with more precision the factors that tend to predict a 
firm’s reliance on pension benefits and deferred compensation. We focused on the 
percentage of the CEO’s annual compensation paid out in these two forms of inside debt 
as our main variable of interest. We collected a wide variety of data about each firm, its 
executive, and its board of directors. To test the efficient contracting hypothesis, we 
 
 237.  Jensen & Murphy, supra note 1, at 251; Jonathan L. Johnson et al., Boards of Directors: A Review 
and Research Agenda, 22 J. MGMT. 409, 411 (1996). To be sure, many directors remain relatively uninformed 
about the details of their firm, Lisa Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 
164–66 (2010), and managers can control the flow of information to their directors. But directors at a minimum 
are better informed than any outside party.  
 238.  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 338–39. 
 239.  Edmans & Liu, supra note 3, at 77. 
 240.  See supra Part II.A (stating managerial power prevents shareholder wealth maximization). 
 241.  To be more precise, we found that there was a 95% chance that the average pension fell between 
$1.857 million and $3.623 million, given the observations in our sample.  The average pension among all the 
886 firm-years with no reported long-term debt (that is, the average including a zero balance at 700 or so firms) 
was $315 thousand.  
 242.  The 95% confidence interval here was $956 thousand to $1.35 million. The average across all zero-
debt firms was $282 thousand. 
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assembled data on the firm’s current debts and its leverage ratio, or the amount of debt 
relative to outstanding equity. 
In addition, to test our own competing hypotheses about the reasons firms use inside 
debt, we assembled a variety of other explanatory variables. One group of variables 
relates to the structure and demographics of the board of directors. Prior literature 
predicts that boards that are large, busy, conflicted, or closely tied to the CEO are less 
likely to challenge her authority.243 We put together information, such as the amount the 
firm pays its directors, that measures those factors. To examine whether directors’ own 
preferences for risk taking might influence their decisions on CEO compensation, we 
computed the average equity and option stakes the board held in the firm, as well as 
looking at the gender profile of each board. At the same time, to test our theory about 
legacy costs of past borrowing, we also examined “lags,” or prior years, of the firm’s 
debt—that is, we examined whether past borrowing predicted current inside debt. 
We also controlled for a variety of firm financial variables and CEO demographic 
characteristics that the literature predicts might influence the value of a CEO’s inside 
debt. We added our own controls for tax considerations, utilizing both current and 
“lagged” tax characteristics of the firm. By including these controls in the regression, we 
isolated the individual impact of the variables we were more interested in. In effect, we 
could ask what impact factors such as firm debt and board compensation would have on 
inside debt, assuming all other things about each firm and CEO were identical.244 
Our regression analysis took two forms, a fixed-effects panel and a set of three 
annual cross-sections. A fixed-effects panel looks at “within” variation, or the impact on 
the dependent variable of changes over time in the explanatory variables for each unit of 
measurement.245 In our case, that meant examining how changes in each firm’s 
borrowing, etc., over the three years of our data impacted its use of inside debt. We also 
controlled for unobservable effects that might vary depending on the particular year of 
each observation—for example, whether there was a financial crisis happening that 
year.246 In addition to predicting the determinants of the percentage of a CEO’s pay paid 
out in inside debt, we also looked at two other measures of inside debt common in the 
literature that precedes our study.247 
For technical reasons explained in more detail in the appendix, we could not make 
use of the evolving differences between firms over time. Instead, for each year in our 
sample, we carried out a standard ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression, using the 
same variables as our panel regressions, across all firms. This allowed us to examine, 
within each year, what effect each firm’s particular characteristics had on its use of inside 
 
 243.  For evidence on board members who serve on several other boards, see Eliezer M. Fich & Anil 
Shivdasani, Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?, 61 J. FIN. 689, 689–724 (2006). For evidence that directors 
with a significant financial stake in being on the board grant higher CEO pay, see Ivan E. Brick et al., CEO 
Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm Performance: Evidence of Cronyism?, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 403, 
412, 417 (2006). On board independence and CEO pay, see Vidhi Chhaochharia & Yaniv Grinstein, CEO 
Compensation and Board Structure, 64 J. FIN. 231, 232 (2009). 
 244.  GREENE, supra note 207, at 29. 
 245.  CHRISTOPHER F. BAUM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN ECONOMETRICS USING STATA 220–21 
(2006). 
 246.  Id. at 224–25. 
 247.  We explain why our own measure is more meaningful in Part VIII, the methodological appendix. 
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debt. 
When we compare changes within firms over time, we argue the evidence most 
strongly supports the managerial power and perhaps directorial risk aversion stories over 
the others. These results are summarized in Table 1.248 Using our preferred variable (the 
leftmost column of numbers in Table 1), we find that a firm’s debt has no significant 
effect on CEO pay. Consistent with the managerial power story, we find overall that both 
higher director pay and higher CEO pay have a significant positive impact on the portion 
of pay devoted to inside debt.249 We argue that higher CEO pay is an indicator of 
managerial power because it suggests that, as managers are paid more, they have a 
greater need to conceal their outsize rewards, and hence make more use of opaque pay 
forms such as inside debt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 248.  Because board demographics and other firm governance variables do not vary much from year to year 
within firms in our sample, inferences from examining their variation are unreliable. See BAUM, supra note 245, 
at 223 (“The coefficients on variables with small within standard deviations are not well identified.”). 
Therefore, we do not report them in Table 1, although we did include them in our regression analyses.  
 249.  We include financial controls (not reported) to account for factors, such as firm size and success, that 
might independently explain correlations between board pay and CEO pay. In any event, there is no obvious 
story for why large or successful firms would be particularly likely to use inside debt.  
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Table 1: Effect of Changes Within Firms over Time 
 
 Portion of 
Compensation Paid 
as Inside Debt 
CEO Leverage Total Inside Debt 
Long-Term Debt .00000175 
(.0000013) 
.00000328* 
(.00000186) 
-.165 
(.142) 
First Lag of Long-
Term Debt 
.00000239 
(.00000174) 
.00000239 
(.00000203) 
-.486** 
(.216) 
Second Lag of 
Long-Term Debt 
.00000103 
(.00000103) 
.00000172 
(.0000016) 
.574** 
(.129) 
Firm Leverage Ratio .0344 
(.0273) 
.0552 
(.0408) 
1072.422 
(1355.562) 
Mean Director 
Compensation 
.0000893** 
(.0000424) 
-.0000216 
(.0000364) 
-.174 
(1.400) 
Mean Director 
Equity 
Compensation 
-.000129** 
(.000055) 
.00000146 
(.0000487) 
-1.157 
(2.155) 
Mean Director 
Option 
Compensation  
-.0000439 
(.0000465) 
.0000761 
(.0000489) 
-5.605* 
(3.293) 
% Firm Owned by 
Top Five Owners 
-.00492 
(.0343) 
.010 
(.050) 
-1580.65 
(2127.948) 
CEO Age .00246** 
(.000629) 
.00336** 
(.00117) 
371.231** 
(72.421) 
Total CEO 
Compensation 
.00000138** 
(.000000612) 
.000000478 
(.000000636) 
.110** 
(.0412) 
2008 .00272 
(.00553) 
.0147** 
(.00722) 
-740.223** 
(286.031) 
2009 .0177** 
(.00653) 
.0799** 
(.0104) 
-45.119 
(354.070) 
Two-way fixed effects regression; robust standard errors clustered by firm.  Year effects 
relative to baseline of 2007. Coefficient reported together with (standard error). 
 *: statistically significant at 10% level in a two-way test against the null of no effect. 
**: statistically significant at 5% level in a two-way test against the null of no effect. 
 
The impact of director and CEO pay is not only statistically significant, but contrary 
to Gerakos’ findings, it is also fairly meaningful in practical terms. Our coefficients look 
small because they include a lot of zeros, but the effect we report is the impact of an 
additional $1 thousand of compensation. The mean director compensation in our sample 
is $163 thousand, with a standard deviation of $115 thousand, and mean CEO annual 
compensation is $5.4 million with a standard deviation of $6.4 million.250 Thus, our 
results imply that a one standard deviation increase in a board’s compensation was 
responsible for a one percentage-point increase in the executive’s portion of inside debt, 
 
 250.  We report a complete set of descriptive statistics in the methodological appendix. See infra Part VIII. 
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while a similar increase in CEO salary accounts for another 0.88 points (e.g., from 1% to 
2.88%). The average CEO received 5.6% of annual compensation in the form of inside 
debt. So a one-deviation increase in board compensation, all else equal, would explain 
more than one-sixth of all the average executive’s inside debt, while CEO salary would 
explain another one-seventh. 
Additionally, we find a significant and negative relation between directors’ equity 
compensation and firm use of inside debt. Option compensation also has a negative sign, 
but not significantly so. Directors’ risk preferences, then, appear to impact CEO pay, with 
directors holding a stake in the upside of the firm preferring to encourage CEOs to take 
risk.251 The size of this effect is similar to the impact of CEO compensation—at our 
sample mean, it reduced inside debt by 0.8 of a percentage point, or about 14% of the 
average total. 
It is possible, of course, that this is an efficient result for a firm that is in a position 
to take good risks, but we think our data suggest the opposite. Our financial variables 
attempted to control for factors that would correspond to risk-seeking firms, such as the 
firm’s industry or whether the firm was in a financial position to make aggressive 
investments. Thus, our regression should treat all firms as having equal opportunities for 
good risk taking. Accordingly, if our controls were effective, the effect we measured for, 
the impact of director equity, could not be due to firm efforts to encourage directors to 
take efficient risks. 
Admittedly, though, there may be other immeasurable factors, such as a firm-culture 
preference for risk, that influence both CEO inside debt holdings and directors’ equity 
payouts. If so, it would be unclear whether director pay directly influences CEO inside 
debt. We do use firm “fixed effects,” which help to control for such unobservable firm-
specific factors, though.   
Finally, on the panel studies, our results from regressions duplicating the dependent 
variables used in prior research (the middle and right-hand columns of Table 1) 
somewhat confirm the findings of those studies. We do find that firm debt is a significant 
predictor of cumulative measures of inside debt, such as CEO leverage and total inside 
debt held. We note, though, that once lags of firm debt are included, the contribution of 
current debt declines or becomes entirely insignificant, supporting our legacy costs story. 
Our annual cross-sections confirm the panel results and add intriguing new details, 
as summarized in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 251.  Because directors hold such a small portion of the firm’s equity, each director is likely indifferent to 
the total costs to the firm of excessive risk taking. Brick et al., supra note 243, at 421. 
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Table 2: Effect of Change Across Firms on Portion of Annual Compensation Paid as 
Inside Debt, by Year 
 
 
 
2007 2008 2009 
Long-Term Debt .000000640 
(.00000227) 
.00000368 
(.0000035) 
.00000704** 
(.000000163) 
First Lag of Long-
Term Debt 
-.0000000965 
(.00000332) 
.00000178 
(.00000519) 
-.00000315 
(.0000028) 
Second Lag of 
Long-Term Debt 
-.000000932 
(.00000311) 
.00000368 
(.000004) 
-.000000311 
(.00000375) 
Firm Leverage 
Ratio 
.000629 
(.0182) 
-.0137 
(.0207) 
-.00218 
(.0264) 
Mean Director 
Compensation 
.0000161 
(.0000344) 
.0000881 
(.0000617) 
-.0000475 
(.0000467) 
Mean Director 
Equity 
Compensation 
-.0000683 
(.0000759) 
-.000183** 
(.0000871) 
-.0000967 
(.0000716) 
Mean Director 
Option 
Compensation  
-.000148** 
(.0000488) 
-.000238** 
(.0000681) 
-.000177** 
(.0000686) 
% Female Directors .125** 
(.0436) 
.114** 
(.0384) 
.131** 
(.0409) 
% Independent 
Directors 
.104** 
(.0267) 
.0808** 
(.033) 
.109** 
(.032) 
% Board < 75% 
Attendance 
-.0663 
(.0989) 
-.0314 
(.0864) 
-.0489 
(.0958) 
% Board with 
Interlocking 
Position 
-.352* 
(.191) 
.119 
(.0992) 
-.0969 
(.0817) 
Board Size .00124 
(.00153) 
.00295** 
(.00144) 
.00455** 
(.002) 
Mean Director Age .00183* 
(.00105) 
.00072 
(.000836) 
.00193** 
(.000934) 
% Firm Owned by 
Top 5 Owners 
-.0470 
(.0352) 
-.0471 
(.0329) 
-.0542 
(.0376) 
CEO Age .00185** 
(.000422) 
.00119** 
(.000427) 
.00166** 
(.000505) 
Total CEO 
Compensation 
.00000128* 
(.000000682) 
.00000108* 
(.000000648) 
.00000449** 
(.0000014) 
OLS regressions with robust standard errors.  Coefficient reported together with (standard 
error). 
 *: statistically significant at 10% level in a two-way test against the null of no effect. 
**: statistically significant at 5% level in a two-way test against the null of no effect. 
 
In addition to largely confirming the panel results, our cross-sectional analyses 
provide further evidence of both the managerial power and risk aversion theories. Factors 
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that are predictors of directorial inattention, such as the age and size of the board, 
correlate with more extensive reliance on low-visibility inside debt.252 And, again, higher 
pay is associated with more opaque pay. Concentrated ownership tends to reduce inside 
debt, although that result is close to, but not quite, statistically significant. We also find 
evidence that firm debt correlates with inside debt, albeit only in one of the three years 
studied. 
Perhaps surprising are the large positive coefficients associated with female and 
independent boards. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of 
the board that is independent implies about a one percentage-point increase in the portion 
of inside debt compensation, which is roughly one-sixth of the average.253 We have no 
reason to believe that independent directors are more likely to turn a blind eye to 
managerial power. 
Instead, we believe that independent directors are on average more risk averse than 
insiders.254 Board members with salary, legal liability, and reputational capital at stake in 
the success of a firm are in effect relatively undiversified investors in the firm, and so we 
should expect them to avoid risk unless paid in some form of equity.255 Risky endeavors 
by the firm also increase the need for time-consuming review of managerial decisions 
and expose the director to a greater likelihood of litigation. Inside directors face many of 
these incentives as well, of course, but they are more likely to hold an equity stake in the 
firm, and may be otherwise subject to control by more senior managers who do.256 
Consistent with this story, Anderson et al., and Bhojraj and Sengupta found a negative 
correlation between board independence and the cost of debt—that is, independent boards 
correlate with lower borrowing costs.257 
 
 252.  For prior evidence on these factors, see John E. Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief Executive 
Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 371–73, 387–88 (1999). Large boards are 
predictive of inattention because of team production problems and general free riding. Older boards are thought 
to be inattentive because of the reduced importance of reputational considerations for the directors, more 
extensive social connections with managers, and perhaps diminished cognitive capacity.  
 253.  There may be a similar risk aversion story for female directors. For evidence that women are more 
risk averse than men on average, see Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, Men, Women, and Risk 
Aversion: Experimental Evidence, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMIC RESULTS 1061, 1061–73 
(Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2008); Rachel Croson & Uri Gneezy, Gender Differences in 
Preferences, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 448, 450–57 (2009). A variety of endogeneity checks suggested, 
however, that some unobserved variable, such as firm culture, contributes to firm preferences for both female 
directors and inside debt. For instance, we found that lags of inside debt predict female board membership.  
 254.  For evidence of this proposition, see generally Yang Ni & Lynette D. Purda, Does Monitoring by 
Independent Directors Reduce Firm Risk? (Mar. 25, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1986289 (explaining that independent directors tend to 
make more conservative decisions). 
 255.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. 
L. REV. 1, 26 (1986) (explaining differences in risk aversion levels between managers and shareholders); David 
Yermack, Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors, 59 J. FIN. 2281, 2281–
308 (2004) (studying the effects of different incentives on directors’ performances). This could also explain, in 
part, our panel data findings that board compensation increases use of inside debt.  
 256.  Our data do not include information on inside director own-firm equity holdings, except for equity 
paid to the inside director qua director.  
 257.  Ronald C. Anderson et al., Board Characteristics, Accounting Report Integrity, and the Cost of Debt, 
37 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315, 317 (2004); Sanjeev Bhojraj & Partha Sengupta, Effect of Corporate Governance on 
Bond Ratings and Yields: The Role of Institutional Investors and Outside Directors, 76 J. BUS. L. 455, 459 
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It is unclear whether our findings on independent boards imply inefficient 
contracting. It is possible that firms whose other stakeholders prefer less risk deliberately 
choose boards that they suspect will rein in CEO risk.258 Or, notwithstanding our efforts 
to control for industry and firm risk profile, it may be that firms that have high expected-
value risky investment options choose boards that allow them to pursue these options. 
But it is also possible that the risk-reducing effects of certain board compositions would 
be a surprise to stakeholders and that they are an unintended consequence of other 
choices. If the risk effects of pensions are unintended, it is difficult to argue that 
stakeholders choose pension compensation for its efficiency. 
Finally, we acknowledge that we find significant coefficients in the theoretically 
predicted direction for our financial controls. For example, firms with opportunities for 
aggressive investment make lesser use of inside debt. Firms that have performed well 
recently have CEOs with a smaller fraction of inside debt income and lower leverage, 
likely reflecting the increase in value in the CEOs’ equity-based portions of their 
portfolios. We also found that the manufacturing and energy industry firms were more 
likely to use pensions, which is consistent with the general impression of experts that new 
industries are more reliant on risky pay.259 
Overall, then, our data imply that existing studies have overstated the efficiency of 
inside debt. By neglecting to include variables we find to have a significant impact on 
firms’ decisions to use inside debt, the existing literature has somewhat overstated the 
case for inside debt. For example, our finding on the importance of directorial risk 
preferences implies that the endogeneity concern highlighted in the Tung and Wang study 
might be a serious issue for the reliability of prior results. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Inside debt is a key aspect of two areas of major public importance: corporate 
governance and financial firm regulation. We have argued that inside debt is unlikely to 
be a useful tool of corporate governance in most situations, and that many scholars, 
including those who cast a cold eye on pensions in the corporate governance context, 
have been insufficiently skeptical of inside debt in the banking context. Among other 
reasons, we suggested that inside debt is inefficient because agency costs of credit are 
already low in and out of bankruptcy, it facilitates managerial hedging and rent seeking, it 
lags a firm’s borrowing needs, and it may be too complex or distracting for humans to 
respond to accurately. 
Further, our own empirical findings offer only weak support for the optimal 
contracting theory of inside debt. Instead, our data suggest that inside debt is the result of 
factors consistent either with managerial power or with accidental distortions of board 
incentives. We cannot entirely rule out the possibility, however, that despite our best 
efforts, some unobservable factors that drive firm-wide risk preferences might be shaping 
 
(2003). Anderson et al. attributed the relation between independence and borrowing costs to a reduction in 
“managerial opportunism.” Anderson et al., supra, at 319. That is a possibility, but they do not rule out our 
story either. 
 258.  See Graham et al., supra note 212 (suggesting that CEOs and managers may match up based on fit of 
“right personality traits for the particular company”). 
 259.  No other industry, including banks, had any significant effect on inside debt utilization. 
Alces –Galle FINAL (Do Not Delete) 11/9/2012 5:49 PM 
2012] The False Promise of Risk-Reducing Incentive Pay 95 
both board and CEO compensation. 
We should emphasize that our theory and findings here do not necessarily imply that 
all forms of incentive-based pay are inefficient. Much of our analysis turns on the low 
agency costs of credit and the perhaps uniquely high costs of inside debt. On the 
behavioral front, our discussion does raise some potential questions about the efficacy of 
complex stock and option packages. More work is needed to pinpoint managers’ 
cognitive threshold for processing incentive pay. What we can say for now is that 
existing evidence suggests adding inside debt on top of an already intricate set of equity 
incentives is unlikely to improve managerial decisions. 
VIII. METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
This Part explains for readers with more detailed interest in statistics the 
construction of the data set employed in Part VI and the econometric methods used to 
analyze it. Our data are composed primarily of firm financial information drawn from the 
online data service Execucomp, executive and director compensation information from 
Compustat, and blockholder information from Thomson–Reuter’s database of 13F 
filings. Due to SEC filing rules, pension and deferred compensation information is 
available only from December 2006 forward, while the Compustat database contains data 
on director compensation, one of our key independent variables, only for 2007 through 
2009. Execucomp tracks filings for firms currently or formerly in the S&P 1500, 
although data is missing for some firms in some years. Accordingly, most of our models 
utilize a panel of roughly 2000 firms over three years, with additional financial 
information (such as lagged firm debt) from prior years as well. Because of missing data, 
most of our regressions ultimately include about 3300 observations on 1300 firms over 
three years. 
We constructed four different measures of firm reliance on inside debt. Following 
the literature, we additionally examined the raw total amount of the inside debt held by 
the CEO, utilizing total pension balance and total deferred compensation account 
balances from Compustat. As in the Cen study and others, we further computed the 
CEO’s personal leverage ratio, consisting of inside debt held over inside debt plus total 
equity and in-the-money unexercised options.260 Also as in Cen, we computed the 
“match rate” of the firm—the ratio of executive over firm contributions to the deferred 
compensation fund—which Cen suggests captures the firm’s effort to incentivize 
deferred compensation contributions.261 
In our view, however, the best indicator of a firm’s preference for inside debt in a 
given year is the portion of annual compensation paid out in pension and deferred 
compensation.262  Other measures in the literature are flawed.  Firm need for risk taking 
can vary by year, but measures of total inside debt balance or personal leverage ratio 
 
 260.  Cen, supra note 223, at 18; Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 6, at 1572; Tung & Wang, supra note 
208, at 14. To reflect the fact that both firm and CEO decisions take place over a range of time within each year, 
we valued the executive’s equity holdings by multiplying the number of shares held on the reporting date by the 
average value of shares during the calendar year. 
 261.  Cen, supra note 223, at 20. 
 262.  See Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 6, at 1567–69; Goh & Li, supra note 224, at 17 (using a 
version of percent inside debt as their dependent variable).  
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mingle together annual firm decisions with the results of prior years’ decisions. And the 
deferred-compensation match ratio obviously omits any information about pension 
utilization. We calculated our alternative measure, which we call “percent inside debt,” 
using Compustat data on annual changes in pension and defined contribution (DC) 
balances, divided by total compensation reported to the SEC.263 
In all cases, we constructed measures both with salary included as inside debt (as in 
Tung and Wang) and without.264 Since we are interested primarily in long-term 
incentives, reported results do not include salary. 
To test the competing hypotheses about the likely determinants of a firm’s use of 
inside debt, we assembled a variety of explanatory variables. One group of variables 
relates to the structure and demographics of the board of directors. Using individual 
director data from Execucomp, we calculated the yearly percentage of each board that 
was independent, interlocking, former employees, financially expert, attended less than 
75% of meetings, and female (excluding the CEO in all cases). We also determined the 
number of directors, as well as their mean age and number of other boards they occupied. 
Similarly, following literature on the effects of board compensation on CEO power265 
and borrowing costs,266 we computed the average total compensation of the board and 
the average equity and option stakes the board held in the firm.267 
In order to test the hypothesized relationship between a firm’s borrowing needs and 
its use of inside debt, we collected total firm long-term debt and total firm debt in current 
liabilities. We also calculated the firm’s leverage ratio, which was simply long-term debt 
over total assets. In addition, we collected lags of the firm’s long-term debt extending 
back to 2003. Regression analyses with all lags included suggested that lags longer than 
two years had no statistically significant impact on the dependent variables, so we 
included only the first and second lags of debt in the reported results. 
We similarly examined the delayed effects of tax on contractual design by including 
both current and multiple lags of tax status of each firm. Because the benefits of tax 
deferral can accrue to both debt and equity, and hence would appear in both the 
numerator and denominator of our main dependent variable, we expect no significant 
 
 263.  Nonqualified executive pensions are typically “defined benefit” rather than “defined contribution” 
(DC). Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 6, at 1552. That is, unlike the pensions most readers have encountered, 
executive pensions are not typically subject to investment risk. Instead, executive pensions resemble an annuity 
guaranteeing the executive an annual payment determined according to a formula. Formulas usually depend on 
salary and bonuses in the years before retirement. Id. at 1561. Accordingly, annual changes in pension value can 
result both from affirmative decisions by the firm to change compensation as well as from “automatic” changes 
deriving from the underlying formula. A firm aiming to design an optimal compensation package, however, 
would adjust its pension formula annually to reflect the ideal degree of risk-seeking behavior for the executive. 
Similarly, firms can annually adjust their contribution to a DC fund to optimize incentives. Thus, we think it 
appropriate to use changes in annual pension and DC value as a test of whether firms employ pensions to 
optimally align executive incentives. However, as explained below, we also control for factors that affect the 
“automatic” adjustments in pension balance, such as firm success and CEO age.   
 264.  Tung & Wang, supra note 208, at 13. 
 265.  Brick et al., supra note 243, at 404. 
 266.  Mine Ertugrul & Shantaram Hegde, Board Compensation Practices and Agency Costs of Debt, 14 J. 
CORP. FIN. 512, 513 (2008).  
 267.  We also computed medians for all the figures for which we determined means. Our results were 
robust to the use of medians rather than means.  
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results. Our findings confirm this expectation. 
Finally, we included a number of firm financial variables and CEO demographic 
characteristics commonly used as controls in the literature. For example, because pension 
formulae may depend on bonuses related to firm performance—but bonus data are very 
imperfectly collected—we computed firm performance, both as the ratio of net operating 
income to book assets, and as return on common equity. Because firms with more 
investment opportunities can be expected to be risk preferring, we control for that using 
the ratio of book-to-market value assets and property, plant, and equipment (PPE) assets 
over total assets.268 Firms with relatively concentrated ownership should be more closely 
monitored, perhaps resulting in less managerial power, and so we calculated the 
percentage of the firm held by its largest five shareholders using 13F filings.269 
We also controlled for the general industry of each firm, using a series of dummies 
for each of the North American Industry Classification (NAIC) categories. We 
subdivided NAIC financial firms into banking, insurance, and other financial to make 
sure that we could observe if the banking industry’s unmeasured leverage, in the form of 
depositors’ claims, would influence outcomes. 
 
 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for 2007–2009 
 
Variable Observed Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
% Board Attending  
< 75% of Board 
Meetings 
4204 .0083 .0318 0 .3333 
% Board Former 
Employee 
4204 .0352 .0672 0 .6364 
% Board with Financial 
Expertise 
4204 .145 .1432 0 .8571 
% Female Board 4204 .115 .0990 0 .625 
% Independent Board 4204 .77252 .1157641 0 1 
% Interlocking Board 4204 .0011 .0152 0 .3333333 
% of Firm Owned by 5 
Largest Blockholders 
7119 .296 .1111 .0001 .9409 
 
 268.  E.g., Walker, supra note 13, at 243. We do not employ the ratio of research and development (R&D) 
to sales used by Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 6, at 1573, because of extensive missing R&D data in our 
sample. 
 269.  Prior studies connecting lower managerial pay to more concentrated ownership include Core et al., 
supra note 252, at 404; Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones 
Without Principals Are, 116 Q.J. ECON. 901, 903 (2001). 
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% Related Board 4204 .0084 .0337 0 .4 
Annual Change in 
Pension* 
5433 425.563 1162.025 -1170.816 20671.74 
CEO Age 5384 54.9577 7.21776 93 93 
CEO’s Leverage Ratio .360 3.228 3.2277 170.618 170.6178 
CEO Total Pension 
Balance* 
5432 2585.56 6583.495 0 87302.01 
CEO Total 
Compensation* 
5426 5406.425 6426.267 0 112464.5 
CEO Total Defined 
Balance* 
5432 2195.611 8675.017 -71.312 245493 
Common Equity* 7642 3062.371 10195.08 -96620 194236 
Common S/h* 7138 26.0192 120.7305 .001 2612.674 
DC Match Rate 1700 2.486 44.7758 -.232 1765.804 
Debt in Current 
Liabilities* 
7641 2430.947 26223.23 0 562857 
Director Age, Mean 4204 61.5243 3.7634  75.8333 
Director Age, Median 4204 61.8374 4.3015  78 
Director Compensation, 
Mean 
5399 162.989 115.3156 -1273.408 1795.866 
Director Compensation, 
Median 
5399 155.657 98.7040 -428.979 1797.116 
Director Options, Mean 5392 31.70 65.9914 899.393 899.3932 
Director Stock, Mean 5393 55.9958 68.8959 1467.36 1467.36 
Ebitda* 7350 1104.66 4280.241 -76735 78669 
Employees 7515 18.5198 64.2189 0 2100 
Firm Performance 5428 .0661 4.5866 -136.4958 209.3245 
Firm Leverage Ratio 7623 .1937 .3803 0 28.6111 
Firm Total Assets* 7646 17439.11 103086.9 .005 2223299 
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Firm Total Long-Term 
Debt* 
7623 3326.156 21398.8 0 466676 
Investment 
Opportunities 
6820 .4944 .4074 0 5.8763 
Is CEO Male? (1=Yes) .967 .9665 .1798 0 1 
Number of Directors 6878 8.4612 2.7951 1 32 
Other Boards/Director, 
Mean 
4204 .8497 .5202 0 2.6 
Other Boards/Director, 
Median 
4204 .6013 .6392 0 3 
Property, Plant, & 
Equipment 
(total, gross)* 
6820 4023.618 14475.39 0 305906 
Ratio of  Change in 
Inside Debt to Total 
Compensation 
5414 .0559 .1136 -.6123 .9924 
Tax Loss Carry 
Forward* 
4734 408.2209 1806.159 0 47300 
Tax Paid* 7352 189.2618 908.4512 -1250 33941 
*: in thousands 
We separately regress each of the dependent variable measures utilizing a three-year 
unbalanced panel. For several of our explanatory variables of interest, such as the 
composition of the firm’s board, there is relatively little variation within a firm from year 
to year. A Hausman test, however, indicated that a random effects approach would 
produce inconsistent results. Given the financial crisis, as well as potential year-specific 
abnormalities in executive pay,270 we expected significant year effects. Accordingly, we 
employed a two-way fixed-effects model. 
To capture some of the information from the variation between firms, we also 
performed a cross-sectional analysis for each of the three years available. In addition to 
the cross-sections reported here, we also carried out a series of cross-section regressions 
using CEO leverage and total CEO inside debt as the dependent variables. With the 
exception of the tax controls, results were qualitatively similar to our reported results, 
suggesting that the correlations we found are robust to the choice of dependent variable. 
We found some significant results for current and lagged tax liability in the total inside 
debt regressions, but that is not surprising, because theory predicts that firms can use 
 
 270.  See Graham et al., supra note 212, at 12 (discussing that components that factor into salary may vary 
by year). 
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either inside debt or stock options to capture the tax benefits of deferral. 
Finally, we note that prior authors in the literature have at times used truncated or 
selection effect regressions, such as a Tobit model.271 Our view is that these models are 
inappropriate.  The theory behind use of the Tobit is that some firms do not use pensions, 
and so the outcome variable is truncated at zero.272 That is not the case in our model, 
which allows for negative growth in pension balances. In any event, the sign and 
significance of our results do not change with the use of a Tobit model, although 
unsurprisingly most coefficients are somewhat larger in magnitude. We also do not 
believe that there is any selection effect in the sample: by hypothesis, firms can reset their 
inside debt amount to any level in any year, so that the decision to use zero inside debt is 
a point on the continuum of inside debt payouts.  In other words, there are no decisions 
we do not observe in the sample. Indeed, tests of the inverse mills ratio generated from 
employing two-step Heckit regressions on the annual cross-sections could not reject the 
null hypothesis that no selection model was necessary. 
 
 
 
 271.  Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 6, at 1573; Cen, supra note 223, at 27. 
 272.  Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 6, at 1573. 
